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CHINESE PRIVATIZATION:
BETWEEN PLAN AND MARKET
LAN CAO*
I
INTRODUCTION
Since 1978, when China adopted its open-door policy and allowed its econ-
omy to be exposed to the international market, it has adhered to what Deng
Xiaoping called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”1  As a result, it has
produced an economy with one of the most rapid growth rates in the world by
steadfastly embarking on a developmental strategy of gradual, market-oriented
measures while simultaneously remaining nominally socialistic.  As I discuss in
this article, this strategy of reform—the mere adoption of a market economy
while retaining a socialist ownership base—should similarly be characterized as
“privatization with Chinese characteristics,”2 even though it departs markedly
from the more orthodox strategy most commonly associated with the term “pri-
vatization,” at least as that term has been conventionally understood in the con-
text of emerging market or transitional economies.
The Russian experience of privatization, for example, represents the more
dominant and more favored approach to privatization—certainly from the point
of view of the West and its advisers—and is characterized by immediate privati-
zation of the state sector, including the swift and unequivocal transfer of assets
from the publicly owned state enterprises to private hands.  On the other hand,
“privatization with Chinese characteristics” emphasizes not the immediate pri-
vatization of the state sector but rather the retention of the state sector with the
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1. Deng Xiaoping coined this term in a statement about China’s attempts to deal with its explod-
ing population growth:  “[T]he problem of China is its excessive population . . . . [O]nly a socialist sys-
tem can solve this problem . . . . The socialism we are talking about is one with Chinese characteristics.”
China Can Only Go the Socialist Road, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Overseas ed.), June 24, 1989, at 1.
2. Matthew Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in China, 3 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 301, 302 (1993).
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concomitant creation of a parallel non-state sector designed to supplement the
state sector and to serve as a social “shock absorber” in the event that the state
sector itself is to be eventually “privatized”—or as Chinese officials prefer it,
“corporatized” or “securitized.”3  In this article, I use the term “privatization”
to describe China’s current stage of ownership reform, even though, as I also
suggest in Part IV, the Chinese strategy has not been to hand control and equity
over to private holders, but, ironically, to bring private savings into state-
controlled shareholding enterprises.  The distinction between “privatization”
and “corporatization” or “securitization” rests on the terms’ ideological signifi-
cance to Chinese officials, who view “corporatization,” the conversion of a
state-owned enterprise into a shareholding company, or “securitization,” the
subsequent sale of such shares on a securities market, as ideologically compati-
ble with “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”  On the other hand, “privati-
zation”—stemming from the word “private” and identified with the institution
of private ownership without necessarily ensuring the preservation of the state
as the agent of the “entire people” in the social ownership of the means of pro-
duction4—is considered to be anathema from an ideological standpoint to the
state’s official adherence to socialism.5
Because China has been ideologically circumscribed by “market social-
ism”—market-based but only palatable to and compatible with socialism—it
has had to opt for a form of privatization that allowed the reformers to argue
for market-oriented reform while promising that the state sector itself will be
insulated from market encroachments.  Despite its blatantly ideological roots,
the Chinese path nonetheless should be examined for its arguably legitimate
economic and theoretical underpinnings—for example, whether there are valid
economic reasons for a strategy that favors retention of the state sector and the
concomitant creation of a non-state sector, and whether state-sector privatiza-
tion, when it is in fact implemented, would be more effective after a full-fledged
non-state sector has been created because then the transfer of ownership from
state to private hands would be taking place in the context of an already mar-
ketized framework.  These types of questions will have considerable policy
ramifications as more and more countries search for an exit from an economic
system based on full public ownership of the means of production and compul-
sory state economic planning.6
3. Even as China introduced a shareholding system, which allowed its state enterprises to be con-
verted into shareholding companies, and even as it instituted securities exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen in 1990 and 1991 respectively, the official policy remained one that opposes “privatization”
and favors “securitization.”  See David Blumental, “Reform” or “Opening”?  Reform of China’s State-
Owned Enterprises and WTO Accession—The Dilemma of Applying Gatt to Marketizing Economies, 16
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 198, 223-24 (1998).
4. See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (1982) (P.R.C.) (enshrining “socialist public ownership of
the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people”).
5. Liu Hongru, Vice Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System,
remarked that “we resolutely oppose . . . privatization.  But we do not because of that oppose the stock
market.”  See Blumental, supra note 3, at 223-24.
6. See, e.g., Barbara Bradley, Burma Capitalism is Half-Baked But on the Rise, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1995, at 8 (discussing the government’s abandonment of “the Burmese Road to So-
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Part II of this article examines the general framework of the privatization
debate, focusing on both the ideological and the economic underpinnings of the
Chinese experience.  Part III studies the first sequence of reform, involving the
creation since 1978 of a non-state sector coexisting on a parallel track with the
state sector and consisting of various types of property arrangements: private
enterprises, collective enterprises referred to as township village enterprises
(“TVEs”), and foreign-invested enterprises.  I argue that the success of this first
phase of reform can be explained by the government’s emphasis on entrepre-
neurship and, consequently, the creation of new firms rather than the restruc-
turing or destruction of existing ones.  It is only in this new, non-state sector
that the fundamentals of a market economy—for example, entry and entrepre-
neurship, exit and bankruptcy—have been established.  Part IV studies the sec-
ond phase of reform, undertaken to inject a system of managerial incentives de-
signed to improve enterprise efficiency without altering the state’s dominant
ownership rights in its state enterprises.  As I argue, this move toward decen-
tralization and greater firm-level autonomy to demarcate the firm as an entity
separate from the state—within a context of partial reform—has unwittingly
created autonomy without governance, resulting in managers or agents who are
insufficiently monitored by owners or principals.  Part V analyzes the third and
current phase of reform—the gradual transformation in the ownership base of
state enterprises—from complete state ownership to a shareholding system de-
fined by majority state shareholding and minority private equity participation.
It is only in this current stage, twenty years after the initiation of reform in 1978,
that China is pursuing privatization as that term is traditionally understood:
transferring state ownership rights to private interests.
Even here, however, China’s strategy for state-sector privatization remains
radically different, in both motivation and implementation, from Russian or
Eastern European privatization.  As I demonstrate in Part V, state-sector priva-
tization in China is pursued only after a vibrant non-state sector has been es-
tablished—not for the purpose of allowing private entities greater ownership
and control over enterprises, but perversely and ironically the exact reverse—to
allow the state to exercise greater ownership and control over a vast pool of pri-
vately-held capital hidden in the non-state sector.  Secondly, state-sector priva-
tization is limited and distorted, again by ideological constraints: (1) the number
of state-owned enterprises that are privatized because of a quota system only
recently abolished; (2) the type of enterprises that are allowed to be listed on
the securities exchanges (state, not private, enterprises); and (3) the percentage
cialism” in favor of a free market by privatizing farming and other industries); Cuba, COUNTRY REP.,
Jan. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Courep File (explaining that by the end of 1994, the
government had allowed some concessions to a mixed-market economy, for example permitting farm-
ers to sell above-quota surplus at market prices); David Lamb, Vietnam Takes Small Step with Big
Board, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at C1 (discussing Vietnam’s nascent stock exchange and the pending
U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement as signs of Vietnam’s continuing journey toward a socialist free market);
Mongolia: Bare Cupboards, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1994, at 37 (discussing Mongolia’s adoption of a
market economy through privatization and foreign investment).
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(a strict minority) of shares in listed enterprises that can be privately owned and
traded.
Despite an auspicious beginning through the creation of a non-state sector,
however, the current state of Chinese privatization remains deeply flawed.
While the initial deferral of state-sector privatization in favor of first creating a
marketized, non-state sector was, I argue, an economically wise strategy—
though understandably a political disappointment for pro-democracy forces—
the government’s current lethargic response toward solving the problems
associated with its economically bankrupt state sector—through its insistence
on maintaining rigid political control over the privatization process and its
continued subsidization of money-losing state firms—has created an
economically untenable situation.  Economic growth from the non-state sector
is merely offset by losses in the state sector, as gains produced by the non-state
sphere and deposited as household savings into state banks are turned into
unrecoverable bank loans used by the government to salvage decrepit state
enterprises.  Reform has been turned into private subsidization of public-sector
inefficiencies.  To the extent that state-sector privatization has been undertaken
at all, it has been on the whole uneven, due primarily to the government’s
preoccupation with political control at the expense of economic efficiency.
Perhaps even more disturbing than the distorted and politicized manner in
which privatization is undertaken, however, is the fact that China is now—as
Russia was at the start of its privatization campaign—so wholly consumed by
the flawed logic of privatization itself—that is, the logic of “who owns what”—
that it has neglected the establishment of key institutional mechanisms abso-
lutely critical to making privatization, and consequently the question of “who
owns what,” work.  Thus, privatization of the state sector, like the restructuring
of state enterprises before it, continues to be unaccompanied by a governance
regime that minimizes transaction costs and ensures that rights of ownership—
whether state or private—are exercised in asset-enhancing ways.  In stage three
of reform, China has wholly submitted to the privatization agenda of Western
advisers—even as it publicly denounces privatization—as it focuses on the lib-
eration of firms and managers from the state’s strictures without also imposing
the necessary constraints.  While the government has imposed an excess of po-
litically motivated regulation to ensure state control of the market, it has ne-
glected to establish the market-based regulation needed to ensure market effi-
ciency.
Whether current privatization efforts can work will depend on the govern-
ment’s ability to muster the will necessary to relinquish political control and al-
low the rudiments of the market to function.  Continued subsidization of too
many state firms has meant the continuation of political, rather than commer-
cially-based, provisions of capital, which has in turn meant too little, if any,
bankruptcy-induced exit for economically insolvent enterprises.  China has
avoided the costs of premature privatization suffered by Russia by first fostering
a thriving non-state sector.  However, unless it takes the necessary actions to
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move its state sector away from the central plan, toward the market and,
equally important, to create institutions that are needed to make a market func-
tion, it will suffer the costs of deferred privatization and economic distortion.
State-sector privatization simply to install private firms and nominal private
owners is not sufficient to create a functioning and transparent market, unless it
is also accompanied by a regime of corporate governance that incorporates in-
sights from information and transaction-cost economics to ensure that owners
and managers act in ways that maximize competition and efficiency and mini-
mize predation and opportunism.
One can only hope that if China had to embrace, in 1978, at the beginning of
reform, an ideologically-based strategy to avoid political transformation and
democratization, and in the process also bypass some of the economic chaos
and disillusionment associated with immediate state-sector privatization, the
economic benefits this strategy have so far generated will not be squandered by
the government’s antiquated insistence on Party control over the economy.  At
the same time, however, as I hope to demonstrate, the critical view that the
Chinese experience is either irrelevant or inconsequential, or that China is but a
recalcitrant adherent of the old ways while others zip toward a more enlight-
ened path, is a grossly incorrect one.7  Those who have argued for more and
faster privatization of the conventional kind to expedite the transition to capi-
talism, regardless of the considerable social consequences (for example, the un-
appealing situation in Russia), are partisans of a hotly contested political posi-
tion—no less political, perhaps, than the Chinese officials who have argued for
their own particular political position of a slower, two-track privatization proc-
ess.
II
THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE: CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE
China began its privatization policy by introducing a market economy, that
is, by creating a non-state sector consisting of non-state enterprises.  “[A]t its
broadest level, the term ‘privatization’ refers merely to the introduction of some
private enterprise into the economy.  For example, enacting a law which allows
an artisan to become self employed is a form of privatization.”8 This mode of
privatization is considered to be rather primitive:  “This meaning of privatiza-
tion was relevant to developments in Eastern Europe less than three to five
years ago.  Now . . . for the most part Eastern European economies have moved
far beyond these initial stages.”9  Thus, “in the context of Eastern Europe,” pri-
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, Understanding the Reform Experiences of China,
Eastern Europe and Russia, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN
TRANSITION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 31-33 (Chung H. Lee & Helmut Reisen
eds., 1994).
8. Richard M. Phillips & Marian G. Dent, Privatizing Eastern Europe: A Challenge for the Nine-
ties, in JOINT VENTURES AND PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE 445, 448 (PLI Commercial Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 575, 1991).
9. Id. at 448.
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vatization means the transfer of state-owned enterprises “to private owner-
ship . . . .  For example, in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the term priva-
tization is generally used to refer to a specific program for the wholesale di-
vestment of state enterprises.”10 However, “[i]n other states, which have not
progressed as far towards a Western style economy (for example Romania and
Albania), privatization may merely refer to the efforts of individual SOEs
[state-owned enterprises] to introduce an element of private ownership or to
create a joint venture with private firms.”11
Whether privatization is to involve “merely” the introduction of some ele-
ments of a market economy or the actual privatization of state enterprises, “pri-
vatization, in the environment of the transitional economies, is not a simple
transfer of ownership from state to private individuals.  It is rather a process by
which the very institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers and
economists employ the term, is reintroduced into . . . [the economy].”12  Unlike
Western European privatization, for example, where privatization means sim-
ply a sale of state assets to an already existing private sector,13 privatization for
transitional economies requires not only the restructuring of the economy but
also the creation of private property and the institutions of a market economy,
while ensuring a maximization of economic growth and a minimization of so-
cial, economic, and political disorder.  Thus, for transitional economies, addi-
tional questions arise concerning both the optimal pace as well as the sequenc-
ing of reform.  If a choice were possible,14 and given the limitation of resources,
10. Id. at 445, 448.  Note that even in the Czech Republic, private companies started after the 1989
revolution appear to be more successful than privatized formerly state-owned enterprises.  See Alla
Vetrovcova, Czech Toys Ready to Play, PRAGUE POST, Dec. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary.  For a discussion of the economic benefits of creating new private businesses versus privatizing
old state-owned enterprises, see infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text. 
11. Phillips & Dent, supra note 8, at 448-49.
12. ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: IS
THE STATE WITHERING AWAY 10 (1994).
13. State enterprises that were privatized in Great Britain, for example, “had to operate in compe-
tition with other private companies and their managerial system (even if often less efficient than that of
their private analogs) was basically a product of the surrounding capitalist business culture.”  Id. at 21.
For example, sales of British Airways, British Steel, and British Telecom took place in a “fundamen-
tally market environment dominated by private property.”  Id.
14. Some scholars have commented that countries with a huge and heavily subsidized state sector,
for example, Russia, would have had a difficult time deferring state-sector privatization.  See, e.g., Sachs
& Woo, supra note 7, at 25.  According to Sachs and Woo, China’s model works only in the context of
its particularly unique initial conditions: a small state sector and a large rural sector with excess labor
unprotected by social subsidies, allowing the government to “release” its agricultural laborers into the
newly created private sector.  Unlike China, Russia did not have a large agricultural sector with surplus
labor eager to take advantage of a new non-state economy, even if Russia had focused on creating such
a parallel non-state sector.  Rather, Russia had a large and heavily subsidized state sector employing a
large number of workers uneager and unwilling to leave the security of the state sector for the vicissi-
tudes of an unsubsidized private sector.  Without a reservoir of rural workers to shift with relative ease
into a newly legalized private market and additionally burdened with a gargantuan state sector, Russia,
thus, had no other option but to engage in immediate privatization of its state sector, which, according
to Sachs and Woo, employed 93% of Russia’s labor force in 1985 while China’s state sector employed
only 18% of the Chinese labor force in the 1980s and its rural sector about 75%.  See Jeffrey Sachs &
Wing Thye Woo, Reform in China and Russia, ECON. POL’Y, Apr. 1994 at 108, cited in Vincent Benzi-
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should privatization of state enterprises proceed before the institution of a mar-
ket economy?  Or should a market-oriented framework be established first be-
fore state-sector privatization?15
For Eastern Europe and Russia, it was presumed that the transfer of owner-
ship rights from state to private hands creates a regime of transparent property
arrangements, and thus such transfer was deemed a prerequisite for the estab-
lishment of a market economy.16  This property-rights focus has caused the de-
bate to be framed primarily in terms of “to whom” and how quickly rights
should be transferred.  State firms, subject to the control of too many different
actors such as governmental agencies and departments,17 lack the right of con-
trol and the right of return—the two main indicia of ownership18—and hence
suffer from incentive and performance-related problems.19  The rights of owner-
ship must be granted to the right actors—private owners whose rights must in
turn be protected by a property-rights regime consisting of clear and legally en-
forceable claims of ownership.  Within that context of clearly defined private
property rights, the natural incentives of private ownership can flow, and a free
ger, Can China’s Gradualist Reform Strategy Be Applied in Eastern Europe 18 (July 1997) (unpub-
lished report, on file with Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University).
For a critique of this argument, see Benziger, supra; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Reform? Ten Years
of the Transition (World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Dev. Econs., Wash., D.C., Apr. 28-30,
1999); see also Barry Naughton, Reforming a Planned Economy: Is China Unique?, in FROM REFORM
TO GROWTH, supra note 7, at  49, 67-68.
15. In a recent article devoted to the economic downturn in Russia since the breakup of the former
Soviet Union, the same question was posed as follows:  “One issue overarched all others and would
haunt the policy and its implementation down to the present.  It was whether reform should push, hell
for leather, the privatization of state assets or if institutions and a market infrastructure should be de-
veloped first.”  John Lloyd, The Russian Devolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1999 (Magazine), at 36.
16. See id. at 38.  Yegor Gaidar of Russia
was determined to proceed with the privatization of state assets, which all the reformers
agreed would break the power of the Communist-era bosses and was, accordingly, at least as
much a political as an economic policy.  It was an article of faith that privatization would fos-
ter honest dealings and civic behavior by creating a middle class with a stake in the coun-
try . . . .
Id.; see also Kimio Uno, Privatization and the Creation of a Commercial Banking System, in WHAT IS
TO BE DONE? PROPOSALS FOR THE SOVIET TRANSITION TO THE MARKET 150 (Merton Peck &
Thomas Richardson eds., 1991) (arguing that privatization of state enterprises is required because “only
private owners can establish an enduring basis for self-financing and managerial independence”);
MARTIN WEITZMAN & CHENGGANG XU, VAGUELY DEFINED COOPERATIVES AND COOPERATIVE
CULTURE: A RECONCILIATION OF A PARADOXICAL PHENOMENON IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 2
(Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion Paper No. 1607, 1992).
To a western-trained economist, the centrality and immediacy to any transformation process
of establishing well-defined property seems so self evident as to hardly merit discussion.  It is
little wonder that . . . the officially sanctioned position of Western governments and interna-
tional lending organizations places the highest priority on the aggressive and rapid establish-
ment of well-defined property rights.
Id.  Privatization is deemed necessary not only to correct market incentives but also to clarify
muddled property relations and rights.
17. See, e.g., Yair Aharoni, State-Owned Enterprise: An Agent Without a Principal, in PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE IN LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 69 (Leroy Jones ed., 1982).
18. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND
MANAGEMENT 288-89 (1992); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Own-
ership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
19. See, e.g., MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRIVATIZING RUSSIA (1995).
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market that responds to information provided by price signals will allow pro-
ducers to respond correctly in accordance with the laws of supply and demand.20
If a free market exists—if property rights are clearly delineated and prices
freely reflect supply and demand—assets will be transferred to those willing to
pay the most, resulting in the most efficient allocation of resources.  This, in es-
sence, is the Coase Theorem:  As long as property rights are created, they will
move to the highest-valued use,21 unless transaction costs are high enough to
prevent an efficient reallocation of resources.22  The institution of a legal frame-
work with rules that lower transaction costs is thus absolutely crucial.  As Coase
observed,
the rights which individuals possess, with their duties and privileges, will be to a large
extent, what the law determines.  As a result, the legal system will have a profound ef-
fect on the working of the economic system and may in certain respects be said to con-
trol it . . . .  It makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange
without specifying the institutional setting within which the trading takes place.23
Under a system of state ownership, assets will not be transferred on the
open market even to the highest bidder.  Privatization of the state sector is
therefore necessary to reallocate resources on a more efficient basis.  Given the
20. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 288.
21. See generally RONALD H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 157 (1988); Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
Whether a newly discovered cave belongs to the man who discovered it, the man on whose
land the entrance to the cave is located, or the man who owns the surface under which the
cave is situated is no doubt dependent on the law of property.  But the law merely determines
the person with whom it is necessary to make a contract to obtain the use of the cave.
Whether the cave is used for storing bank records, as a natural gas reservoir, or for growing
mushrooms depends, not on the law of property, but on whether the bank, the natural gas
corporation, or the mushroom concern will pay the most in order to be able to use the cave.
One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear delimitation of rights on the
basis of which the transfer and recombination of rights can take place through the market.
Id. at 25.
22. See generally RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 21
(discussing how transaction costs are part of any institutional framework, although they can be higher
or lower depending on the existence or nonexistence of certain rules.  For example, transaction costs
would be higher in a regime with no rules against fraud, or rules on fiduciary duty, because the relevant
economic actors would have to engage in more investigation and monitoring to protect their interests).
23. RONALD H. COASE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION 7 (University of Chi-
cago Occasional Paper No. 28, 1992); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Choice of Institutional Framework:
A Comment, 17 J.L. & ECON. 493, 493 (1974) (“[T]he way in which property rights are defined can af-
fect the costs of transactions, [and] any change in those rights will affect the transactions that are car-
ried out.”).  Having the appropriate legal system, of course, is not the only way in which transaction
costs might be lowered.  There are non-legal or extra-legal mechanisms as well, such as norms of trust
that govern the behavior of community members.  See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and
Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 863-74 (1999) (discussing how social norms, particularly those
based on a community’s common cultural base, guide community behavior, promote trust, lower trans-
action costs, and hence promote exchanges among community members); Stewart Macaulay, Private
Legislation and the Duty to Read–Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit
Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (1966) (describing how trust obviates the need to engage in “a
suspicious line-by-line analysis of the writing”).
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ever-present possibility that old, entrenched interests may reassert themselves,24
and given “the Coasian idea that the initial private owners didn’t matter too
much as ‘the market’ would soon reallocate the assets to the efficient owners,”25
privatization should be undertaken as quickly as possible.  Government preda-
tion, not market failure, was the immediate problem.26
That is the approach adopted by Russia and favored by Western advisers.27
In two years, between 1992 and 1994, for example, Russia transferred shares in
more than 11,000 state enterprises constituting more than seventy percent of its
24. Under the theory that the state’s many grabbing hands preyed upon and interfered with private
firms, privatization is a necessary corrective to state predation. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER &
ROBERT VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998).
25. Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 19.
26. See SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 24, at 11 (Russian privatization “de-emphasized corporate
governance precisely because the intent was to reduce the damage from government failure rather than
from market failure.”).  This does not mean that Russian reformers undertook the task of privatization
and ignored all else.  It only means that given limited resources, “privatization became a major fetish
while competition policies and other market regulations were seen as minor afterthoughts.”  Stiglitz,
supra note 14, at 20 n.37.
27. Largely overlooked by economists and advisors is the New Economic Policy “NEP,” the Rus-
sian privatization experiment of 1919-28.  After the Bolshevik coup d’etat in 1917 and the ensuing large-
scale nationalization, Russian industrial production was at 13% of its pre-WWI volume, the grain har-
vest had fallen more than 50%, coal output and iron ore extraction dropped 70% and 93%, respec-
tively, and GNP and average monthly wages fell by more than 60%.  See Gerhard Rempel, Russian
New Economic Policy (visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/russia/
lectures/31nep.html>; NEP: Capitalism for a Day, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library.  In 1918, in response to these problems, the Communists adopted a tactical denationali-
zation of small-scale industry and restoration of market economy known as the “NEP.”  See Adam J.
Albin, Comment, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union: The 1920s and the 1980s, 9 J. INT’L L. BUS. 633
(1989); see also NICHOLAS RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 490-91 (4th ed. 1984); RUDOLPH
SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY: ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 84-90
(1945).  The state kept control only over banking, foreign trade, and large-scale industry.  See NEP:
Capitalism for a Day, supra.  In 1920, a new tax system allowed peasants to pay tax in kind (fixed at
10% by 1921).  By 1922, peasants were permitted to lease land and hire labor, and two thirds of gov-
ernment revenue was coming from the food tax and a variety of direct money taxes.  See Rempel, su-
pra.  Seventy-five percent of retail trade was in private hands by 1923.  By 1924, private enterprises ac-
counted for more than 50% of butter and eggs production and as much as 50% of the grain production
in some parts of the Soviet Union.  Even large state-owned enterprises were ordered to operate on a
commercially-reasonable basis, which meant that other state enterprises were no longer given priority
in the allocation of goods and services and had to compete with private contractors. By 1925, 50% of all
state-manufactured consumer goods were sold to private traders.  See NEP: Capitalism for a Day, su-
pra.  The fruits of the quasi-market economy were spectacular and impressed even foreign observers.
See id. (citing ARMAND HAMMER, QUEST OF THE ROMANOFF TREASURE (1932)).
This economic success, however, led to social antagonism; Orthodox Bolsheviks started viewing the
policy as a resurrection of capitalism and finally stopped the experiment out of political fears of its suc-
cess.  In 1925, the state re-instituted control over the prices on basic industrial materials, fuels, and
freight transport, as well as control over the production and distribution of key commodities.  Credits
began to be disbursed administratively and were often denied to private enterprises.  See Rempel, su-
pra; NEP: Capitalism for a Day, supra.  In 1926-27, a campaign to eliminate the “new bourgeoisie” was
in full swing.  Private trade was cut almost by 50% by 1928 and the Soviet Union’s first five-year state
economic plan was initiated.  By 1930, private enterprise became marginal, practically non-existent.
The result was a severe deficit of food and consumer goods that lasted until 1993.  See RIASANOVSKY,
supra at 490-92; NEP: Capitalism for a Day, supra.
For a discussion of Russia’s current posture toward the private sector (as opposed to its privatiza-
tion of the state sector), see infra notes 40, 43, and 65.
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industrial sector to private holders.28  Yet, “[t]he Coasian argument that there
would be a quick reallocation of assets to ‘efficient’ producers failed in part be-
cause there was no genuine secondary market for the same reasons that there
was no real primary market—so the assets were ‘looted’ rather than resold.”29
The Coasian model, in other words, could not work because the privatizers did
not create the institutional framework to minimize transaction costs and facili-
tate the subsequent reallocation of resources to the highest-valued use.
China, by contrast, has pursued the exact opposite strategy, which has al-
lowed it to sidestep the issue of reallocation and highest-valued use altogether,
at least in its first phase of reform.  Chinese reformers deferred state-sector pri-
vatization and focused on establishing the fundamentals of a market-oriented
economy—in other words, a working market—in the newly created non-state
sector.  As I discuss in Parts III, IV, and V, however, in the Chinese context, a
market-oriented economy that functions on commercial rather than politicized
terms has been established, unfortunately, only in the non-state sector—hence
the rapid growth and increased productivity of non-state enterprises.  The Chi-
nese state sector, on the other hand, continues to languish despite state-sector
privatization because of the absence of key institutional mechanisms necessary
to make privatization work.  Yet, as the Chinese should have learned from the
lessons of Russia, transferring state assets to private entities—without regula-
tory safeguards designed to lower transaction costs and ensure the effective
workings of a market—will not result in market growth and efficiency.  Indeed,
the “privatize now, regulate later” approach might even result in the creation of
vested interests that oppose later efforts to “regulate away” their early gains
achieved in the initial stages of unregulated privatization.30
Political and ideological considerations were among the factors that
prompted Russia and many Eastern European countries to engage in speedy
and mass privatization of state-owned enterprises31 and China to favor insula-
28. See JOHN S. EARLE ET AL., OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES, PATTERNS OF CONTROL AND
ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR IN RUSSIA 1 (Centre for Economic Performance, London Bus. Sch. Discus-
sion Paper No. 315, 1996).
29. Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 20.
30. Id.
31. Political consideration—the concern that Russia’s and Eastern Europe’s unique historical mo-
ment had to be decisively seized to ensure against political backlash and the return of Communist
power—was one among the many factors that prompted immediate state-sector privatization in East-
ern Europe.  See, e.g., U.S. Policy Toward the Former Soviet Union: Hearings of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) (testimony of Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State)
(“Our approach in assembling last year’s foreign assistance program was to reinforce those trends in
Russian political and economic life that together, we believe, constitute the essence of the great trans-
formation underway in that country.  Those trends are democratization and privatization.”); Jeffrey
Sachs, Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES 15 (1991) (“The need to ac-
celerate privatization is the paramount economic policy issue facing Eastern Europe. If there is no
breakthrough in the privatization of large enterprises in the near future, the entire process could be
stalled for years to come.”); Catherine Mann et al., Political and Economic Consequences of Alterna-
tive Privatization Schemes 8 (Conference on Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy
of Post-Communist Transformation, sponsored by the Center for German and European Studies at the
University of California, Berkeley, and the Friedrich Ebert Stifftung (Feb. 11-13, 1993)) (“Speed is im-
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tion of the state sector from private economic encroachments and preservation
of social ownership.32  While remaining nominally socialistic, Chinese reformers
argued against ideological purity in favor of economic pragmatism.33  Thus,
Deng Xiaoping referred to a Sichuan proverb, “[i]t does not matter if it is a
yellow cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice,”34 to make the case for re-
ducing the role of central planning and expanding the role of markets.  At the
same time, however, market creation and expansion, while an economic im-
perative, must be subordinate to the state sector and contained within doctri-
nally acceptable perimeters.35  Thus, a non-state sector separate from public
ownership of the means of production—“markets at the margin, parallel to cen-
tral planning,”36 was created even as the state sector itself was preserved.  De-
spite an almost complete absence of International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
programs—or as some claim, precisely because of the absence of bad IMF ad-
vice37—Chinese privatization is now characterized by an “increasing market ori-
entation . . . in ownership, production, investment, and demand”38 and guided by
an overarching criteria of “balancing growth with stability, order with dyna-
portant, since proceeding slowly risks allowing political opposition to develop that could weaken and
perhaps unravel progress achieved to date.”).
China’s strategy of deferring state-sector privatization also has political and ideological roots: the
desire to maintain a foundation of state ownership.  See infra Parts IV and V.
32. Arkady Volsky, President of the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and
leader of the Civic Alliance, suggested that Russia should learn from China’s experience where “re-
forms have not been accompanied by declining living standards.”  Yelizaveta Leontyeva, Power Strug-
gle Goes on Against Background of Economic Dislocation, RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, Nov. 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library.  However, Russian ex-prime minister Yegor Gaidar disagreed.  He
stated that Russia could not use China’s model, because,
[i]n China, effective state discipline was combined with consistent promotion of business ac-
tivity, and a powerful structure of authoritarian rule was preserved. Any attempts by the op-
position to destabilize the situation there were ruthlessly suppressed. . . . There is no division
of powers in China, and no nascent democracy, and it is not a federal state.  To follow the
Chinese path, Russia should have elaborated a political strategy different from the one the
Russian Parliament voted for in 1990.
Sergei Chugayev, Gaidar Presents a Government Program to the Deputies, RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST,
Oct. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library.
33. Even when referring to so capitalist an institution as the stock market, Wei Wenyuan, chief ex-
ecutive of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, insisted that “when we think about the development of our
economy, we have stopped thinking about whether it is socialism or capitalism.”  Michael Hirsch,
China’s Financial Revolutionaries, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int’l ed.), July 31, 1993, at 43, 51.  Simi-
larly, Huang Guixian, an executive at Shanghai Shenyin Securities, remarked, “We used to decide first
if something new was socialist or capitalist . . . . Now we see whether it works, then decide whether it is
socialist or capitalist.”  Id.  Under Deng Xiaoping, “practice [is] the sole criterion of truth.” Gerrit
Gong, China’s Fourth Revolution, 17 WASH. Q. 26, 35 (1994).
34. Deng Xiaoping, How to Recover the Agricultural Production, in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG
XIAOPING (1938-1965), at  292, 293 (1992).
35. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM
128-44 (1995) (describing the Chinese plan of ensuring that market reform be contained within a “bird
cage”).
36. Wei Li, A Tale of Two Reforms, 30.1 RAND J. ECON. 120 (1999).
37. See generally Lloyd, supra note 15, at 38.  The IMF embraced privatization of state enterprises
as the linchpin of market reform.  See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ET AL., THE ECONOMY OF
THE USSR: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (1990) (“The ultimate goal of ownership reform
is to privatize almost all enterprises.”).
38. Gong, supra note 33, at 35.
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mism, change with constancy.”39  China, in other words, took a politically in-
duced path that allowed it to avoid many of the economic problems associated
with Russian privatization.40  As the World Bank’s chief economist has noted
recently in his controversial critique of the IMF’s role in Russian privatization,
“those who put privatization above all else were clearly wrong . . . .  [They]
thought that you had to pursue privatization, and infrastructural change would
follow.  They thought that the new owners of private property would demand
that this happen.  But instead they took their money out.”41
Chinese departure from the conventional wisdom that prevailed in Russia
and Eastern Europeby merely adopting a “traditional form of privatization
[that] occurs when the state withdraws altogether from certain economic activi-
ties and creates an opportunity for private entrepreneurs to act in such
fields”42—has produced a prosperous non-state economy only tenuously con-
nected to the state sector.  Why has Russia, which moved to dismantle an ineffi-
cient economic system as exhorted by Western advisers such as the IMF, expe-
rienced a perpetuation of inefficiency and persistent economic downturns?43
39. Id.  The fear of social instability is understandable for a country like China, with an estimated
1,152,428,417 individuals and 300,388,130 households in 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, and
three special municipalities.  Id. at 30.
In contrast, Western-led reform in Russia, as noted in a recent article by World Bank Chief Econo-
mist Joseph Stiglitz,  took
an ideological, fundamental and root-and-branch approach to reform-mongering as opposed
to an incremental, remedial, piecemeal and adaptive approach . . . . Some economic cold war-
riors seem to have seen themselves on a mission to level the “evil” institutions of Communism
and to socially engineer in their place the new, clean and pure “textbook institutions” of a pri-
vate property market.
Lloyd, supra note 15, at 36.
40. “Why, then, does Communist China have growth rates and foreign investment that put Russia
to shame? . . .  Perhaps because . . . China . . . provided a semblance of order, thereby allowing the crea-
tion of totally new businesses.” Jonas Bernstein, Party Lines: A Transition For Russia, But to What?
MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library.  Indeed, Russian state support and
protection of private enterprise was always largely rhetorical.  The State Committee to Support Private
Enterprise was short-lived.  Small businesses, often subjected to racketeering practices of organized
crime, were never sufficiently protected by law enforcement.  See Kirill Koriukin & Alexander Gor-
deyev, Small Firms Retreat Into Shadow, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary; Natasha Mileusnic, U.S. Security Firm Joins War on Crime, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library.
41. Lloyd, supra note 15, at 39.  Ironically, one of the primary reasons Russian privatization took
the path it did was precisely to forestall political opposition from interest groups with a stake in the old
enterprise, such as labor unions and ex-Party members, who may scurry to “get their tentacles around
the state enterprises.”  Sachs, supra note 31, at 16.
There have been quick responses to Stiglitz’ report; see Stiglitz, supra note 14, which blames the
failure of the Russian economy on reform that neglects institution building.  See Sick Patients, Warring
Doctors, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 81.  Those condemned by Stiglitz denied that there was insuffi-
cient emphasis placed on institution building and legal reform.  Anders Aslund of the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace has been more blunt: “Stiglitz is a striking embarrassment to himself
and the World Bank.  Without knowing anything, he mouths any stupidity that comes to his head.” Id.
42. Tamas Horvath, State Shrinkage in Hungary in the 1980s, in PRIVATIZATION AND
DEREGULATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 413 (Dennis J. Gayle & Jonathan N. Goodrich eds., 1990)
(emphasis added).
43. At least three historical reasons complicated the process of Russian privatization, whether its
privatization of the state sector or its construction of a private sector.  First, following the NEP experi-
ment, see supra note 27, Russian private enterprise was effectively eradicated (in contrast to the situa-
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And why has China, which preserves an inefficient economic system against
outside advice, experienced, for the most part, increased efficiency and eco-
nomic growth?
There are sound socioeconomic reasons for committing resources to the
creation of a viable market framework instead of the adaptation or destruction
of the old state sector.  For centrally planned economies like China, creating a
new market might entail merely removing state barriers and allowing a private
entrepreneurial spirit to take over.  As there are transaction and opportunity
costs to both the privatization of state enterprises and the creation of a distinct
non-state sector, a transitional economy with limited resources might be faced
with a tradeoff—doing what, when.44  “There was always the facile recommen-
dation that ‘everything is important’ and ‘everything should be done at once.’
But real choices are always necessary given the real limitations on any govern-
ment’s time, focus, and resources.”45  Limited financial and creative resources
can be used either to devise auction schemes, outright sales, voucher distribu-
tion, and other intricacies required to implement state-sector privatization,46 or
it can be used to finance and facilitate the growth of new companies through the
tion in Poland, where private enterprise, “however limited in scale, has been preserved not only in the
agricultural sector but in handicrafts, trade and service sectors as well.”).  Leonid Fridman, Reform and
Its Advisers, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library.  Second, throughout its
history, the Soviet Union promoted heavy industry at the expense of other sectors, especially those that
required individual initiatives, which in turn discouraged and dampened the entrepreneurial spirit.  See
id.  Third, the initial privatization experiment, the voucher experiment of 1992 (providing each citizen
with one voucher worth 10,000 rubles to be used for the purchase of shares of state companies or regis-
tered investment funds, or to be traded in the market), was largely a fiasco and further dissuaded en-
trepreneurial spirit.  Most citizens chose to turn in their vouchers to investment funds, many of which
exploited the people’s trust by collecting large amounts of vouchers only to disappear without a trace.
Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatization as an International Phenomenon: Kazakhstan, 14 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 1399, 1415 (1999).
In addition, the state’s emphasis on its mass privatization program essentially overwhelmed and
“smothered” other possible reform efforts.  Approximately 85,000 small enterprises and 14,000 medium
and large enterprises have been transferred to private hands.  In 1997-98, privatization continued with
the sale of 70 large enterprises yearly, some of which included oil, energy, and telecommunications
companies.  Mitrofanskaya, supra, at 1414-17.  Simultaneously, the employees could choose either (1)
to receive 25% of the stock shares to the workers and have an option to buy another 10% at a discount
(with the state retaining the minimum of 60%) or (2) to receive 51% of the common shares (with the
state retaining the minimum of 49%).  In any event, only 20% of the state-retained shares were voting,
thus effectively limiting the level of state control.  See Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman,
Current Development: The FCPA in Russia and Other Former Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT’L L.
378, 382 (1997).  This emphasis on privatizing the state sector might have contributed to a de-emphasis
on establishing a new, private, sector.
44. For example, “the creation of a commercial code is probably more important to the new entre-
preneurs who are building new commercial relationships and who do not have the backing of the state,
than to the state-sector firms with their traditional ties.”  Peter Murrell, Evolution in Economics and in
the Economic Reform of the Centrally Planned Economies, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET
ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 35, 51 n.32  (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992).
A tradeoff in opportunity costs occurs, for example, when the creation of a private-sector framework of
predictable and transparent laws receives lower priority from the government than the design and im-
plementation of state-sector privatization schemes.
45. Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 19.
46. For an account of the privatization methods used in Eastern Europe, see BUTTERWORTHS
PRIVATISATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (Stephen A. Rayner ed., 1992).
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removal of barriers to entry and the institution of commercial codes, legal pro-
cedures, and a tax collection system.  As some economists have noted,
too many hopes have been invested in privatization and rather too much intellectual,
social, and political capital is being consumed in the process of privatization.  The ar-
gument is strengthened when the efforts behind privatization are contrasted to the
lack of attention being paid to creating and fostering the development of new private
sector firms.47
As China experienced in its first sequence of reform, innovation and growth
may come with the emergence of new firms, and not necessarily with the de-
struction or restructuring of established ones. One of the more significant
drawbacks of a strategy that focuses on the inefficient state sector is the “under-
standable but nonetheless misplaced fixation on the old assets . . . . Important
questions are what the old assets are worth and whether they are worth enough
to be occupying as much time, attention, and scarce resources of politicians, fi-
nance ministries, and ministries of ownership as they have, in fact, been given.”48
Equally significant, by establishing a separate market economy, China also
avoided having to deal prematurely with the administrative complexities of
valuation at a time when it would have been difficult to assign an accurate mar-
ket value to assets that have previously had none, especially given the absence
of a mature market, a developed pricing system, or a generally accepted ac-
counting standard.49
Additionally, as the Chinese experience demonstrates, there can be a de-
monstrably positive correlation between the old, state sector and the new, non-
state one.  A study of 434 Chinese cities revealed, for example, that at least  in
the incipient stages of reform, state firms, rather than being a drag on the new,
non-state economy, might actually stimulate the emergence and growth of non-
state firms.50  Like other centrally planned economies in transition, the purchase
of inputs and sale of outputs in China remain linked to the central planning sys-
tem despite efforts to de-link portions of the economy from the central plan.
As a result, once the state allows private businesses to enter the economic
47. Murrell, supra note 44, at 45.  “In many Eastern European countries, policy toward the private
sector can be characterized, at best, as one of benign neglect.”  Id.  “[I]t is quite unusual to find authors
who emphasize the costliness of the privatization process and the need to slow down this process in or-
der to channel resources to the new private sector.”  Id. at 48 n.18.  Instead, time, energy, and resources
had to be devoted to devising and administering a vast multiplicity of schemesfor example, public
offerings, public auctions, sales to private buyers or institutional investors and buyouts by insiders.
48. Anne O. Krueger, Institutions for the New Private Sector, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET
ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 222 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992).
49. For a detailed discussion of valuation problems, see Hans J. Blommenstein et al., Privatizing
Large Enterprises: Overview of Issues and Case Studies, in CENTRE FOR CO-OPERATION WITH THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION & ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, METHODS OF PRIVATISING LARGE ENTERPRISES 11, 16 (1993); David Gordon, Pri-
vatization in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience, 25 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 517, 531-33 (1994);
Robert J. Toltzman, Valuation Issues—Problems and Solutions, in BUTTERWORTHS PRIVATISATION IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 61 (Stephen A. Rayner ed., 1992).
50. See SHANG-JIN WEI & PENG LIAN, LOVE AND HATE: STATE AND NON-STATE FIRMS IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 1 (Center for Pac. Basin Monetary and Econ. Stud., Econ. Research Dep’t.
of the Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Pac. Basin Working Paper Series No. PB93-10, 1993).
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mainstream, new firms may be able to take advantage of the already established
state-sector firms involved in the “downstream and upstream of the production
process,”51 enabling new firms to rely on the old state firms’ demand for new
products rather than worrying about finding new input supply and output mar-
ket.
By contrast, “if one closes the state firms all at once at the beginning of a re-
form, the existing interfirm production chains are also severed.”52  The sudden
destruction of state firms for the purpose of boosting efficiency and growth may
itself cause a decline in growth because it may create a void in the production
and distribution chain that may take years for private businesses to fill.53  The
authors of the study concluded, however, that once a private or non-state sector
has emerged, the dismantling of inefficient state enterprises becomes necessary.
Buoyed by the initial presence of the subsidized state sector, private firms
may also take advantage of “free-riding on the social safety net” financed by the
old state sector.54  For example, at the time the study was conducted, a state firm
paid from forty to fifty-five percent of its profits in income tax; a collective such
as a township village enterprise paid thirty-five percent; and a foreign-invested
firm paid only fifteen percent if it were established in special economic zones.
As a result, a Chinese family will likely take advantage of both sectors by hav-
ing one person work in a state enterprise to secure social welfare benefits and
another person work in the private sector to take advantage of the higher
wages.55
Besides the economic benefits, the social benefits generated by the Chinese
experience are equally compelling.  A dual-track approach minimizes transition
costs and social instability because the preserved state sector provides an an-
chor during the tumultuous beginnings of the market, so new firms do not have
to sink or swim but may rely, initially at least, on the established production and
distribution chain provided by the preexisting state sector.56  In turn, the newly
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 6-7.
53. Hypothetically, all private entrepreneurs could form new businesses to respond to each other’s
supplies and demands and to provide mutual inter-firm production and distribution.  However, because
this scenario is unlikely to happen, the “economy can be stuck in a nongrowth equilibrium.”  Id. at 8;
see also Wei Li, A Tale of Two Reforms, supra note 36, at 2:
[T]he disintegration of the centralized organization of production permits each monopolistic
state enterprise to pursue its own monopoly profits by restricting output to the detriment of
the economy as a whole . . . . [B]ecause the Chinese reform preserves the centralized organiza-
tion of production but allows the emerging product markets, however imperfect they may be,
to organize the production of the above-the-plan output, it leads to a general expansion of
output in the state industry.
Id.
54. WEI & LIAN, supra note 50, at 8.
55. See id. at 9 n.6.
56. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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established, non-state market may also cushion some of the shocks that accom-
pany state-sector privatization by absorbing laid-off state-sector workers.57
Instead of destroying the state sector, and in the process possibly causing
economic downturns triggered by the destruction of the old economy before al-
ternative market forces have been introduced, the Chinese model, in other
words, has been focused on retaining the state sector until an alternative non-
state economy can be established.  The paradox has been noted: “[T]he most
important aspect of the transition to a spontaneously functioning market econ-
omy cannot be initiated by market forces themselves.  Indeed, the only force
powerful enough to set the market forces in motion is the very state that is sup-
posed to remove itself from the picture.”58  However, if the focus is on the crea-
tion of new economic entities and new rights rather than transferring non-
existent and non-functional rights from state firms to private holders, then it be-
comes evident that “the state, however much a source of problems, also hap-
pens to be the only organization capable (over the long term) of creating a
property-rights system and (over the short term) of providing interim measures
to stabilize firm-level incentives.”59 As I show below, the emphasis in the past
twenty years in China has been on reconfiguring the economic universe to pro-
duce a synergistic relationship between the two combined state and non-state
economies.
III
PRIVATIZATION WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: CREATING A
NON-STATE SECTOR
China began creating its non-state sector in the 1970s by focusing on agricul-
tural reform and adopting measures to “generat[e] huge increases in productiv-
ity, income, and output, with negligible state investment.”60  With the com-
mencement of rural reform in 1978, China became self-sufficient with regard to
food production within two years.61  By doubling the incomes of its farmers, ru-
ral reforms also had political appeal because they immediately benefited 800
million people.62
Reform began not through the adoption of costly, complex, or other cum-
bersome measures that would have necessitated a high degree of governmental
57. See H. Lyman Miller, Holding the Deng Line, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 28.  Then
General Secretary Jiang Zemin, in a report reaffirming commitment to market reforms, “emphasized
the urban . . . sector as an area of future growth that could absorb workers displaced by reforms in the
State sector.”  Id.
58. FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 12, at 57.
59. EDWARD S. STEINFELD, FORGING REFORM IN CHINA: THE FATE OF STATE–OWNED
INDUSTRY 40 (1998).
60. WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A
NEW SUPERPOWER 37 (1993).
61. See Diane Francis, Election the Only Solution for Russia: Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev,
FIN. POST, Mar. 27, 1993, § 5 (Weekly ed.), at S3, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASIAPII File.
62. See OVERHOLT, supra note 60, at 37.
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involvement or investment.  The experiment in profit retention for farmers, for
example, required only that “[f]actors of production . . . be released to the new
private sector,”63 so that those in the new economy would have access to capital,
labor, and land for productive purposes.  In one of the most significant reform
measures, China dissolved farming collectives or communes in favor of a
household-based agricultural system.  Assets once owned by the communes
were sold to the farmers at low prices, allowing the new household-based busi-
nesses to accumulate the necessary start-up assets at a relatively low cost.64
Commune land, distributed to individual households, was converted into
household land or “family plots” in which farmers were granted a “leasehold”
on the land65 and then granted a high degree of autonomy and flexibility in pro-
duction and sales, as long as certain production quotas owed to the state were
met.66  Under a “contract responsibility system,”67 farmers organized by house-
hold units contracted with the state to sell a set quantity of produce at state
price, but any surplus generated above the established quota was sold at free-
market price.68  Through the introduction of markets “at the margin,” parallel to
63. Christopher Clague, Introduction: The Journey to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 1, 11 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser eds.,
1992).  For example, “[l]and and building space should be made available; labor needs to move out of
the public sector, and loans should be provided.”  Id.
64. See Keun Lee, Making Another East Asian Success in China, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH:
supra note 7, at 183, 190.
65. See A Survey of Perestroika, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 59; Robert Wessel, Reestablishing
Private Business in Previously Socialist Economies, BUS. ECON., Jan. 1992, at 30, 32.  Note in compari-
son that the Russian rush to privatize extended to almost everything but the commune lands.  Russia’s
Parliament (Duma) is still unable to pass a Land Code ensuring private land ownership.  On July 17,
1998, the Duma’s coalition of democratic parties won by a small margin over the Communist and ultra-
nationalist blocks and refused to adopt the latest draft of the Land Code which would have prevented
nearly all private ownership of land and nearly all commercial land transactions, apart from those in-
volving small private homes and summer-home plots, full ownership of which had been legislatively
conferred in 1992.  The draft’s apparent goal was to effectively preserve the existing state-owned collec-
tive farms (still the dominant form of farming) and make it virtually impossible for a “land owner” to
sell, lease, or mortgage his or her land.  See Roy Prosterman, Looming Land Code, MOSCOW TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1998, at 7.  The inability to mortgage leads to the inability to obtain the necessary financing.
(One farmer needs as much as 20 million rubles to start his business.)  See Yelena Tokareva &
Yevgeniya Pishchkova, Everything Has Been Ploughed Up . . . , RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., July 25, 1992, at
3.  Consequently, 80% of Russia’s 24,000 state farms and 270,000 private farms are insolvent.  See
Yevgenia Borisova, Bringing in The Harvest, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at 15.  In an attempt to
improve the dire economic situation, some regions and municipalities have passed regional mortgage
bills.  See Yevgenia Borisova, Samara Lawmakers Pass First Farm Mortgage Bill, MOSCOW TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1999, at 13; Natalya Shulyakovskaya, Bill Readies Moscow to Sell Land, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec.
11, 1998, at 4.  However, these regional or municipal steps are subject to a possible repeal by a future
federal land code and are themselves insufficient to create the necessary level of certainty to induce
broad investments of banks’ funds and farmers’ efforts.  As of October 2000, when this article was be-
ing prepared for publication, a new federal land code that would grant the right to sell and buy property
has still not passed.
66. See Lee, supra note 64, at 190.
67. Wessel, supra note 65, at 30, 32.
68. See id. at 33-34.
LANCAO_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:39 PM
30 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
the central plan, and the institution of a “dual-track pricing system,” gross farm
output increased within ten years by an astonishing 138%.69
This extraordinary increase in production output, plus an extraordinarily
high average household saving rate estimated at twenty-three percent of dis-
posable income,70 made it possible for farmers to increase their cash reserves,
which they used to finance new enterprises without having to rely on state
loans.  “In effect, very hard budget constraints71 were imposed on farmers (i.e.,
little credit was made available by the state banking system) as they entered the
market economy.  Further, the newly independent farmers viewed themselves
as being undercapitalized for financing on-farm investments, and they began
building up their cash reserves.”72  From 1978 to 1996, the Chinese economy
grew at an average annual rate of 9.9%, with a corresponding increase in the
living standards of its people.73
This capital surplus created the foundation for the emergence and prolifera-
tion of non-state enterprises, most notably, the township village enterprises
(“TVEs”).  The “accumulation of wealth by rural families in China led to the
emergence of non-farm industrial production and corresponding markets in ru-
ral and suburban towns and townships.”74  When the government relaxed its
monopolistic grip over industry in 1979 and allowed the economy a modest shift
toward light, consumer-goods manufacturing, start-up firms organized along
various types of market-based ownership lines75 rushed in to fill the niche: col-
lectives, private, foreign-invested firms, and even some firms officially catego-
rized as state enterprises because they had been sponsored by local or provin-
cial governments.76
69. Id. at 34.  See generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINA’S
ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1992 (1995).
70. However, before the 1978 reforms, the average household saving rate in China was a mere two
percent of household income.  See Naughton, supra note 14, at 58.  See Sachs & Woo, supra note 7, at
28.
71. “Hard budget constraints” is the opposite of “soft budget constraints,” a term coined by Hun-
garian economist Janos Kornai to refer to the utter lack of connection between a firm’s earnings and
expenditures.  Even if a firm’s expenditures chronically exceed its earnings, the firm’s management
does not undertake internal adjustments because the state will step in and provide the needed subsi-
dies.  See generally JANOS KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE (1980); Vedat Milor, Changing Politi-
cal Economies: An Introduction, in CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-
COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES 6, 20 n.17 (Vedat Milor ed., 1994).
72. Pradumna B. Rana & Wilhelmina Paz, Economies in Transition: The Asian Experience, in
FROM REFORM TO GROWTH, supra note 7, at 119, 127, 130.
73. See generally WORLD BANK, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: FIGHTING INFLATION, DEEPENING
REFORMS (1996); see also Lee, supra note 64, at 185 (noting that within six years of market-based re-
forms, from 1978 to 1984, China had an annual growth rate averaging 8.3% in real net material prod-
uct).
74. Lee, supra note 64, at 190.
75. There are four categories of firms in the non-state sector: individually owned firms, foreign-
invested firms (both of which are privately owned, subsumed under the categories of “private econ-
omy” and “individual economy”), TVEs (including urban and rural collectives), and state-owned en-
terprises.  See generally WEI & LIAN, supra note 50.
76. See Naughton, supra note 14, at 58.
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Among the emerging firms in the new, non-state sector, TVEs have demon-
strated one of the most remarkable growth and output rates.77  Between 1981
and 1990, for example, TVE output grew at an average rate of twenty-nine per-
cent per year while exports grew at an average rate of sixty-six percent per
year.78  The TVE sector has become the second largest in China’s economy,
producing, for example, an estimated thirty-three percent of coal, forty-nine
percent of canned goods, and fifty percent of electric fans in China.79  Within the
rural sector, TVEs account for three-quarters of rural industrial output, or more
than one-quarter of the national total.80
Although TVEs are not private enterprises because they are deemed to be
“collectively owned,”81 they nonetheless operate in a market environment out-
side of the state plan, are not subsidized by the state, and are subjected to hard
budget constraints.82  Even before reform, “[t]hey were run by local agencies
with virtually no access to capital, they acquired inputs through informal chan-
nels, they had to sell outputs on local markets, and they set prices accord-
ingly.”83  As a result, TVEs behave like market-oriented producers in function-
ing market economies, with market-based inducements for entry and exit.84
Like other new firms in the non-state sector that operate within an institutional
environment of not only market autonomy but also budget constraints, TVEs
have had little choice but to exhibit market-oriented behavior.
It is clear that economic growth in China has come primarily from the non-
state sector.  In 1978, seventy-eight percent of national industrial output derived
from state-owned firms; by 1993, state firms accounted for only forty-three per-
cent of such output and non-state firms fifty-seven percent.85  Between 1978 and
1993, the share of state-sector employment also declined from seventy-five to
less than sixty percent in the urban areas and from sixty to thirty percent in the
77. See Hong Kong’s Economy Safe in China’s Hands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 12, 1993, at
14, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
78. See WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 16, at 9; see also JEAN C. OI, STATE AND PEASANT IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 99 (1989).
79. See WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 16, at 9.
80. See Jiahua Che & Yinqyi Qian, Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Cor-
porate Governance: Understanding China’s Township-Village Enterprises, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1
(1998).
81. All members of the community—either a township or a village—are nominal owners while the
community itself is considered the de facto owner.  See WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 16, at 11; see also
Che & Qian, supra note 80, at 1 (“TVEs are neither state-owned enterprises, cooperatives (such as la-
bor-managed firms in Yugoslavia and workers cooperatives in Mondragon, Spain), nor private enter-
prises . . . . TVEs are best characterized as community enterprises with a governance structure in which
the community government has control.”).
82. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 12.
83. Id. at 13.
84. See generally William A. Byrd, Entrepreneurship, Capital, and Ownership, in CHINA’S RURAL
INDUSTRY 198-207 (William A. Byrd & Lin Qingsong eds., 1990).
85. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA 373-75 (1994), cited in Che & Qian, supra note 80, at
30; see also Sir Alec Cairncross & Cyril Z. Lin, The Private Sector That is Driving China, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1993, at 13; Gong, supra note 33, at 31.
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rural areas.86  Besides creating an economically dynamic non-state sector and a
shrinking state sector,87 China also achieved economic growth at an average an-
nual rate of ten percent88 as well as an unprecedented increase in foreign trade,89
with exports as a portion of GNP rising from approximately five percent in 1978
to almost twenty percent in 1991.90
Despite its dwindling significance in both output and growth when com-
pared to its non-state counterpart, the state sector remains remarkably large, a
continuing albatross on the state.  China currently has more than 200 million
people employed in its 340,000 state owned enterprises, which account for
thirty-four percent of the country’s total industrial output, fifty-seven percent of
its total fixed asset investment, and more than one-third of its GDP.91  At the
beginning of reform in 1978, the state sector employed seventy-eight percent of
the urban workforce, and by 1995, after almost twenty years of restructuring, it
still employed a hefty seventy percent.92  According to an official 1994 report,
the top 1,000 largest state enterprises,93 directly supervised by the central gov-
ernment, still comprise the bulk of the country’s heavy, capital-intensive indus-
try.94  Unlike the medium and small state firms that have been increasingly
edged out by non-state enterprises and have therefore experienced a significant
decline in state-sector output share,95 these large state firms still monopolize
86. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA, supra note 85, at 373-75, cited in Che & Qian, supra
note 80, at 30.
87. As a result, the Constitution was revised in 1988 to reaffirm the primacy of the state sector but
also to recognize the emerging non-state economies.  “The state permits the private sector of the econ-
omy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law.  The private sector of the economy is a
complement to the socialist public economy.”  XIANFA art. 11 (1982).  The Asian Development Bank’s
1994 Asian Development Report stated that state firms grew by 6.4% while TVEs grew by more than
40% and private enterprises as well as foreign-invested enterprises grew by more than 45%.  See
Ramon Isberto, China Development: From Boom to Bust?, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 11, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, INPRES File.
88. See OVERHOLT, supra note 60, at 29.  The growth rate declined to four percent in 1988 and
1989, moved up to seven percent in 1991 and to 12.8% in 1992.  See id. at 29-30; see also Yingyi Qian &
Chenggang Xu, Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ, 1 ECON. OF TRANSITION 135 (1993).
89. See OVERHOLT, supra note 60, at 27.  By 1992, foreign trade rose to $166 billion and exports
increased from $14.8 billion in 1979 to $85 billion in 1992.
90. See Qian & Xu, supra note 88, at 135.
91. See A Major Test for State Enterprise Reform, INSIDE CHINA MAINLAND (Inst. for Current
China Studies, Taiwan), Jan. 1998, at 41, cited in Blumental, supra note 3, at 3.  See generally WORLD
BANK, CHINA’S MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISE ASSETS: THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER (1997);
YUANZHENG CAO ET AL., FROM FEDERALISM, CHINESE STYLE, TO PRIVATIZATION, CHINESE
STYLE 1 (Centre for Econ. Pol’y Res. Discussion Paper No. 1838, 1998).
92. See STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU 90 (1996), cited in STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 16.
93. Other figures place the number of large state firms at between 2,000 to 3,000.  See STEINFELD,
supra note 59, at 11.
94. Large state enterprises dominate natural monopoly industries such as telecommunications and
railroads as well as other government monopoly industries such as airlines, banks, electricity, oil, and
petrochemicals.  See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA, supra note 85, at 388-91, cited in CAO ET
AL., supra note 91, at 6.
95. Small and medium state enterprises, which together account for 95% of all state enterprises,
are supervised by county, city, or provincial governments.  Small and medium enterprises are in lighter,
more competitive industries, such as electronics, textiles, and food processing, and other light manufac-
turing.  See CAO ET AL., supra note 91, at 6.  It is only in these smaller state firms that there has been a
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heavy industry, even increasing its output from 41.5% of the total in 1978 to
43.6% in 1991.96  Plagued by poor management, outright corruption, and social
welfare-type obligations,97 many are ailing.  Approximately fifty percent of state
enterprises, according to official Chinese figures, operated at a loss in the first
half of 1995, and forty-seven percent operated at a loss in the first three-
quarters of 1997.98  Yet, until a national system of medical care and other social
insurance is instituted, the government has been reluctant, for social, economic,
and political reasons,99 to pursue full state-sector privatization. This may explain
why the government began its state-sector reform, not by privatizing the state
sector, but by implementing alternative strategies such as property-rights re-
form and governmental decentralization as part of a general move to separate
the state from the management of the firm.100
IV
THE STATE SECTOR: STATE-ENTERPRISE REFORM WITHOUT STATE-SECTOR
PRIVATIZATION
China, though a self-proclaimed socialist country, is slowly but increasingly
becoming marketized.  The market now governs the supply, demand, and prices
of most goods and services where the plan once controlled quotas and prices.101
significant decline in state-sector output share.  In 1978, urban small and medium state firms constituted
49.4% of total output; in 1985, 38.3%; and in 1991, 25.2%.  See NAUGHTON, supra note 69, at 164.
96. See NAUGHTON, supra note 69, at 164.
97. Under communism, state enterprises have traditionally been responsible for providing workers
with comprehensive “cradle to grave” benefit packages such as pensions, subsidized housing, medical
care, child care, food, and recreation.  See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA
WAKES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER 310 (1995); see also Joseph Kahn, Wel-
fare Wanes: Holes in China’s Safety Net Open Way for Providers, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at 1.
As remarked by Wang Shiyuan, then Secretary General of China’s State Commission for Restructuring
the Economic Systems, “[o]nly when the social security system is established and perfected can enter-
prise reform be further deepened and a system realized in which efficient enterprises prosper and inef-
ficient ones fail.”  Paul Blustein, Can Half-Reformed China Last?  Hybrid Economy is neither Socialist
nor Capitalist, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1993, at A27.
98. See Pamela Yatska, No Soft Landing, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 13, 1997, at 62; see also
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, APLA NO. 97-10008, CHINA’S ECONOMY IN 1995-97, 28 (1997),
cited in Blumental, supra note 3, at 210.
99. See generally Gregory Fossedal, Enlist the Masses to Solve China’s Dilemma, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 1998, at 10 (more than 500,000 workers protested in 1997 when state enterprises “paid” their
employees with IOUs); Jasper Becker, Unpaid Miners Blocking Rail Lines, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 10, 1998, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File (social unrest and workers’ protest
threatened government); Patrick Tyler, Overhaul of China’s State Industry at a Standstill, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1994, at A12 (workers’ threat of rioting when a large state-owned knitting mill laid off 2,000
workers as part of a restructuring plan to bring the factory out of insolvency).
100. Some authors who have written about privatization generally have also attempted to move the
privatization debate from what they consider to be “the ideological ground of private versus public to
the more pragmatic ground of managerial behavior and accountability.”  See John B. Goodman & Gary
W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 26,
28.
101. See NAUGHTON, supra note 69, at 289-91.  Prices have been freed for about 95% of consumer
goods and 85% of industrial inputs, although the government could intervene periodically in the pricing
of daily necessities, basic urban services, and key commodities.  See People’s Republic of China: Key
Economic Indicators (visited Nov. 12, 1999) <http://www.mac.doc. gov:80/tcc/data/commerce_html/
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To bring its state enterprises further within the market’s orbit without privatiz-
ing their ownership structure, China created a comprehensive legal framework
aimed at transforming state-run enterprises into merely state-owned ones, sepa-
rating the government’s ownership of an enterprise from its management and
administration.102  In a move aimed at emulating the success of China’s rural re-
forms, the Party Central Committee declared in its 1984 “Decision on Reform
of the Economic Structure”103 that “from now on government departments at
various levels will, in principle, not manage or operate enterprises directly,”104
signifying the government’s recognition of an enterprise as a “legal person”
separate from the government department in charge.105  Pursuant to a parallel
countries/Countries/China/country/Reports/1988/KeyEconomic.html>.  For example, to promote de-
velopment in the western part of China, the government relaxed price controls on rail transportation,
airfare, automobile manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and tourism for the region.  See SDPC Adopts
Pricing Policy to Promote Western China Development, CHINAONLINE, Sept. 6, 2000, available in
LEXIS, News Library.  It has also lifted price controls on natural gas.  See China to Lift Control on
Natural Gas, ASIA PULSE, Aug. 18, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library.  In early 1998, grain prices
were freed, but later that year—after China’s state grain companies had lost more than 100 billion yuan
competing with prices set by private enterprises—private grain dealers were prohibited from doing
wholesale business and price control was re-instituted.  See New Grain Distribution System Working in
China, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 22, 1998; Chinese Premier Tells State Grain Procurers to Com-
pete With Private Trade, BBC, May 31, 1998.
The issue of which commodities and industries are to be subjected to price regulation and economic
plan is first settled on the state-wide level and then at the provincial level, where each province can
designate additional commodities or industries as essential and subject them to the province’s own eco-
nomic plan.  For example, on the state level, China regulates such commodities as meat, sugar, and
vegetables as well as public services, new technology sectors, industries related to state security, bank-
ing, and insurance.  See Time to Fix SOE Distribution, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 28, 1999, at 4; China: Text of
Chinese Communist Party Decision on State-Owned Enterprises, BBC, WORLDWIDE MONITORING
Sep. 27, 1999; No Privatization for State Enterprises, BBC, Sept. 27, 1999; China to Improve Essential
Commodity Distribution System, ASIA PULSE, Apr. 26, 1999.  Conversely, such major industries as coal,
machine-building, electronics, and textiles are not subject to the state-wide control.  See SOE Reform
Guidelines Restated, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 21, 1998, at 4.  However, these industries could be controlled
on a local level.  For example, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Provinces considered chemicals, building ma-
terials, metallurgy, and machine building essential enough to be regulated by the provinces’ economic
plans.  Hebei Province Decides on Pillar Industries up to 2010, BBC, WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan.
12, 1998.
102. See NATALIE LICHTENSTEIN, ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: THE EVOLVING LEGAL
FRAMEWORK 5 (World Bank Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. 1198, 1993).
103. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Eco-
nomic Structure, translated in BEIJING REV., Oct. 29, 1984, at I.
104. Id. at X.
105. “An enterprise shall obtain the status of a legal person in accordance with the law and shall
bear civil liability for property which the State has authorized it to operate and manage.”  Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People art. 2 (1988), re-
printed and translated  in CHINA L. FOR. BUS. (CCH Austl.) 13-534 [hereinafter Enterprise Law].  Arti-
cle 2 granted managers the rights and responsibilities of management.  Article 14 prohibited the enter-
prise’s departments in charge from interfering with the management of the enterprise.  The rights
provided by the Enterprise Law, however, are subject to “regulations of the State Council.”  Enterprise
Law, chs. III, VI.  Even before the passage of the Enterprise Law in 1988, the Economic Contract Law
had referred to state-owned enterprises as “legal persons.”  In 1987, the General Principles of Civil Law
defined a legal person as an organization with the legal capacity to enjoy civil rights and the compe-
tence to perform civil duties as well as to bear civil liability.  See General Principles of Civil Law of the
People’s Republic of China art. 48, translated in 2 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
225 (1987).
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plan modeled after the rural “responsibility system,”106 state enterprises, as
separate legal persons, were granted a degree of autonomy and allowed to re-
tain their after-tax profits107 to give managers the incentive to increase their
companies’ competitiveness and profits.  As I develop further below, however,
reform measures such as managerial decentralization and even state-sector pri-
vatization itself, undertaken without the necessary, key institutional mecha-
nisms of a true market economy, will not only fail to induce market and com-
petitive behavior, but also produce the reverse of what was intended: predatory
and rent-seeking behavior108 by economic entities that are newly autonomous,
yet dangerously unmonitored by any meaningful system of governance.
To separate the firm from the state and to create opportunities and incen-
tives for the firm, responsibility contracts have been instituted at all levels of the
production and distribution chain, “between the state and enterprises . . . be-
tween central and local authorities, between localities, between local authorities
at various levels and between an enterprise and its staff and workers.”109  Man-
agers enter into contracts enumerating production targets to be met within a
specified period of time.110  Once the targeted performance goals have been met,
the enterprise is allowed to retain its excess profit for use in any way its man-
agement deems necessary, giving management certain rights over production,
marketing, labor, procurement, investment, and asset disposition.111
In theory, then, state agencies are expected to concentrate on the general
implementation of their governmental functions and not on the micro-
management of firms.  As part of the decision to shift authority downward, local
agencies themselves are supposed to rely on a local tax base and not on fiscal
subsidies from the central government.112 Authority and opportunity are dis-
persed downward, from a once unified and monolithic source within the com-
mand economy to disaggregated constituent entities exhorted to act competi-
tively and commercially.113
Consistent with its rural reform plan initiated ten years earlier, the govern-
ment’s state enterprise reform also involved the institution of a dual-track pric-
106. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
107. See Decision of the Central Committee, supra note 103, at XII.
108. Rent-seeking behavior is behavior aimed at extracting earnings without any corresponding con-
tribution towards the production of activities necessary to generate those earnings.
109. Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up Four Modernizations, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 16, 1978, available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File.
110. See Andrew X. Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securi-
ties Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 73 (1993).
111. See Rules on Transforming Management of State Enterprises, ch. II, arts. 6-22 (1992), Gazette
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (1992), translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, July 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File.
112. Pursuant to a system of fiscal contracting between the central and local government, the latter
is given the right to collect and keep tax revenues, which in turn motivates it to promote local busi-
nesses such as TVEs.  See OI, supra note 78, at 99-102; see also Andrew G. Walder, Corporate Organi-
zation and Local Government Property Rights in China, in CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES:
PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES, supra note 71, at 53.
113. See generally STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 45-77.
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ing system within the state sector itself.  Goods produced by state firms had to
be sold at low prices to state agencies on the plan, but above-quota surplus
could be sold at higher prices on the open market.114  The two-track pricing sys-
tem was important for two reasons.  First, it exposed state enterprises to market
processes and, together with the system of managerial incentives described
above, was instrumental in encouraging some firms to re-orient themselves to-
ward greater productivity and efficiency.  Second, it allowed state firms to inter-
act with non-state firms, while competitive, profit-minded state enterprises
sought to streamline and economize by subcontracting with more efficient non-
state businesses.115  The dual-track pricing system, in addition to the increasingly
market-oriented nature of other spheres of the economy, meant that state en-
terprises—as legal entities separate from their departments in charge—had to
learn to do more than simply navigate the bureaucratic channels for subsidies
and quotas.116
Basic data compiled from 1978 to 1988 revealed that the gross output value
of state enterprises increased from 342.1 billion yuan in 1978 to 1.35 trillion
yuan in 1988.117  The total factor of productivity in state-owned industry also in-
creased during the 1980s at an annual average of 2.4%.118  However, despite this
apparent increase in productivity119 and years of market reforms, remarkably lit-
tle has changed in the environment in which state firms operate, at least in ways
that would cause state firms to change their behavior significantly.  In fact, the
very market-based reforms adopted to alter the economic behavior of state ac-
tors—decentralization and delegation of independent fiscal responsibilities
from the state to the enterprise on the one hand, and greater managerial auton-
omy and incentivization on the other—often have had unintended conse-
quences.  Decentralization has broken up the command economy, as it indeed
was intended to do, but it also has resulted in a disaggregated state consisting of
numerous decentralized agencies and departments from various central, re-
gional, and local ministries and their respective branches, each eager to exercise
114. See id. at 181-87.
115. See Naughton, supra note 14, at 53.
116. Even large state enterprises such as China’s largest tractor manufacturing company, for exam-
ple, had to experiment with new and innovative ways to increase its market share:
“‘to improve the quality of its products as well as its marketing and publicity techniques in a
bid to offset . . . sluggish domestic sales  . . . . The Luoyang tractor complex had been forced to
sacrifice more than half of its profits in trying discounts, lotteries and free delivery of goods to
boost sales.’”
Thomas G. Rawski, Progress Without Privatization: The Reform of China’s State Industries, in
CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING
COMMUNIST STATES, supra note 71, at 39 (quoting Anming Gao, Giant Tractor Maker Plagued by
Slow Sales, CHINA DAILY, May 28, 1991, at 4).
117. See Rawski, supra note 116, at 30.
118. See Walder, supra note 112, at 60.
119. To what extent this increase in productivity is mere “paper” profit is unknown, due to the ex-
treme unreliability of  financial information.  See infra notes 146-156 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over the firm and correspondingly, “extractive authority over firm
assets.”120
Despite newly enacted regulations that prohibit the department in charge
from managing or intervening in the management of  the enterprise,121 de facto
control still exists,122 and even more troubling, precisely because of decentraliza-
tion, control is exercised not just by one authority, but by multiple authorities,
each with muddled claims of one sort or another against the firm, each acting
“in the name of the state but serv[ing] their own parochial interests, employing
powers of extraction perfected in earlier times.”123  The Chinese refer to the
problem as having too many mothers-in-law.124  Various administrative agencies
at both the national and local levels invested in an enterprise vie to exercise
control over it, thereby subjecting the enterprise to overlapping and often con-
flicting vertical—usually one of the industrial administrative bodies attached to
a central ministry—as well as horizontal—usually the local people’s govern-
ments or their agencies—lines of authority.125
As a result, the agency/principal problem typical in any large firm126 is dou-
bly compounded in an economy marked by informational uncertainties, unreli-
able accounting, and inconsistent financial data.  How is the relevant govern-
mental department that is presumably acting as “owner” able to monitor
effectively the firm’s managers if there is no reliable information about firm in-
put, output, productivity, assets, or liability?127  Further, if there are multiple
governmental entities exerting conflicting ownership claims to the firm’s assets,
and no one entity has unassailable authority over the firm, to which supposed
“owner” is the firm’s management accountable?  Conversely, which agency
among the many that assert the authority to interfere and to tax also is willing
to accept the risk and responsibility that come with ownership?128
120. STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 6.  In this article, I have reevaluated my initial more positive as-
sessment of China’s second phase of economic restructuring: state-enterprise reform without state-
sector privatization.  See Lan Cao, The Cat that Catches Mice: China’s Challenge to the Dominant Pri-
vatization Model, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 97, 144-51 (1995).
121. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
122. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 45; see also Anna M. Han, China’s Company Law: Practicing
Capitalism in a Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 457, 489-90 (1996) (discussing the in-
tervention at the firm level by various vertical and horizontal administrative authorities).
123. STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 61.
124. See Blumental, supra note 3, at 225, 224 n.108.
125. See Han, supra note 122, at 489; see also STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 91 (discussing the confu-
sion at one state enterprise about which agency among the many governmental agencies might be the
true “owner” of the company: the State Council, the State Planning Commission, the State Commission
for Economics and Trade, or the various local governments of Lioaning Province or of Anshan City).
126. The problems derived from the separation of ownership and control have been revealed and
analyzed in ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
127. For a discussion of the informational uncertainties in the Chinese economy, see STEINFELD,
supra note 59, at 45-77.
128. As an example, a firm studied by Professor Steinfeld entered into a responsibility contract with
various entities on the state side—the State Commission for Economics and Trade, the State Commis-
sion on Economic Structure Reform, and the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry.  See STEINFELD, supra
note 59, at 94.
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The separation of the firm from the state has subjected the firm to varying
forms of unchecked predatory behavior, such as inordinately high taxes and du-
bious fees and levies,129 even when the firm has no earned surplus and is barely
staying afloat on short-term debt.130 Arbitrary and excessive taxation, in turn,
has made it all the more difficult to discern between truly inefficient firms and
firms that are efficient but overly taxed.  Under such conditions of informa-
tional distortions, rent-seeking behavior becomes hard to trace and account-
ability difficult to impose.131  “As the state is driven out, the modicum of moni-
toring and control that existed under the old system virtually disappears, yet
nothing arises in replacement,”132 particularly a regime of governance to allevi-
ate the problems of informational distortion, imperfect monitoring, and oppor-
tunistic behavior.
In addition to decentralization at the state level, the implementation of
measures at the firm level, aimed at separating the firm from the state, also has
had unintended and detrimental consequences, because they were not sup-
ported by the proper institutional conditions, especially those related to bank-
ing and credit.133  In an overall environment that emphasizes liberation of the
firm from the state and the manager from the plan without a corresponding re-
gime of constraints, especially hard budget constraints, more autonomy for the
enterprise and the manager has not always produced competitive, market-
oriented behavior.  Despite financial-sector reforms in which the government
replaced direct subsidies to state enterprises with bank loans134—again, in an ef-
None of the parties on the state side shared any risk with the firm, so they neither enforced
the contract effectively nor adjusted it when it clearly seemed to be operating against the well-
being of the firm.  Second, since none of the state parties was held directly accountable, none
defended [the firm] Angang against interference by other agencies not included in the con-
tract.
Id.
129. See id. at 67, 268 n.21.
130. The firm’s capital input is met through loans and sales that are neither truly loans nor sales.
Loans can be “repaid” by rolling them over.  Sales are recorded as having been completed even when
the firm is not paid or is forced into providing credit.  However, a sales tax is levied whether or not the
firm is paid.  Once sales taxes are paid, the firm owes additional levies and non-tax fees to various other
municipal, provincial, and central agencies.   See id. at 95.
131. Indeed, managers with a poor performance record may not fight state predation because exces-
sive taxation may provide them with the excuse needed to mask their own inefficiencies.  See id. at 67.
132. Id. at 75.
133. Some banking reform has occurred.  In 1983, the government created a two-tiered, state-
owned, but commercially oriented, banking system.  The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was
separated from the People’s Bank of China, with the former designated as a commercial lending opera-
tion and the latter continuing on as the country’s central bank.  See NAUGHTON, supra note 69, at 255.
Still, the commercial banks are not truly commercial because they are subject to orders from the central
authorities to make policy loans and to bail out politically important firms.  See infra notes 141-44 and
accompanying text.  For an examination of banking-sector reform, see GANG YI, MONEY, BANKING,
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS IN CHINA 27 (1994) (stating that the aim is to give “more freedom of op-
eration and profit motives to specialized and other commercial banks, making them independent eco-
nomic entities while macro monetary policy was controlled by the central bank”).
134. For a general discussion of the switch from direct state subsidies to bank loans used to support
ailing state enterprises, see generally HARRY G. BROADMAN, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF
ENTERPRISE REFORM (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 283, 1995).  Because of the decline in the
government’s revenue due to the stagnation of its state sector, the government had fewer resources at
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fort to create some semblance of hard budget constraints on the relevant eco-
nomic actors135—capital, in the form of bank credit, continues to be lavished
upon state enterprises at the request of the managers, regardless of whether the
loans will be repaid.136  Not only has this shift been ineffective from a market
perspective, and undermined by the absence of a functional regulatory regime,
it is also a form of private subsidy borne by ordinary household depositors,
many from the countryside of the South, to support ailing state firms in the cit-
ies of the North, causing a massive transfer of wealth from the rural to the ur-
ban sectors.137  Total bank loans measured on an annual basis grew from fifty
percent of the GDP in 1978 to ninety percent in 1996,138 with the majority of
loans directed toward state-sector firms.139  Nonperforming loans held and rolled
over by state banks are estimated to be at more than 1.27 trillion renminbi or
even higher.140 State-owned commercial banks, which are theoretically self-
supporting but in reality supported by the state, continue to provide credit to
state firms on non-market terms, performing none of the functions associated
with commercial lending, neither screening the borrowers for creditworthiness
nor monitoring and enforcing the loans.141  In fact, banks are often directed by
the central government to make non-commercial, policy-based loans to certain
state firms, in which case the loans may be supported by the credit of the central
its disposal to bail out state firms.  See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA 22-23 (1996).  At the same
time, it was unwilling to run up a fiscal deficit and thus shifted the burden to the banking sector instead.
See BROADMAN, supra, at 25; see also CAO ET AL., supra note 91, at 16 (describing how the Budget
Law of 1995 prohibited the central government from “deficit financing its current account”).
135. Under the old plan system, firms that received direct government subsidies had little incentive
to maximize their capital allocation.  Rather, their incentive was often to consume all of their annual
allocation and to overestimate their future capital requirements, as capital came without cost.  To alter
this behavior, the government decided to make capital-allocation decisions on more market-oriented
terms—by switching from direct government subsidies to bank loans.  The rationale is that, rather than
support state firms with subsidies that come from the central budget, interest-bearing loans, extended
by the major state banks on quasi-commercial terms, would force the borrowers—the state firms—to
ensure the efficient use of such loans.
136. See, e.g., Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Wary Chinese Edge Into Capitalism, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
9, 1997, at A38; Greg Mastel, A China the World Could Bank On, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1997, at A17;
Thomas G. Rawski, Is China Next?, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at 8; see also STEINFELD, supra
note 59, at 68-77; cf. CAO ET AL., supra note 91, at 17 (describing financial reforms as having had the
effect of reducing local influence on credit allocation and increasing the hard budget constraints of state
banks made to adopt international standards for bank assets and commercial-based lending).
137. See Liu Binyan & Perry Link, A Great Leap Backward, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Oct. 8,
1998, at 19 (reviewing HE QINGLIAN, CHINA’S PITFALL 1998); STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 22, 75, 96,
264 n.54.
138. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 19-20.
139. By 1995, outstanding loans to the state industry was 3.36 trillion renminbi, which was 83% of all
outstanding bank loans for that year.  See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 20.
140. See Henny Sender, Small Change, China’s Banks Labour with the Baggage of Their Past, FAR
E. ECON. REV., Aug. 8, 1996, at 62; Craig S. Smith, China Scrambles to Avert Banking Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 6, 1996, at A1.
141. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 71 (“Once [the banks] have made policy loans directed from
above, bank officials have nothing to lose by simply loaning the rest of their available capital to the
highest bidder, regardless of the bidder’s creditworthiness.”).  For a contrary and more optimistic as-
sessment of banking reform in China, see CAO ET AL., supra note 91, at 17 (arguing that the centraliza-
tion of the central bank’s operation and the restriction of the authority of the central bank’s local
branches to make independent loans have reduced the local government’s influence over credit policy).
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bank itself, the People’s Bank of China (“PBC”), based on lending quotas allo-
cated by the PBC to regional banks nationwide.142  Banks may also be pressured
by provincial and local government agencies into making loans to politically fa-
vored state enterprises,143 a problem that has grown even worse because of de-
centralization.144
Against a background of such broad, systemic distortions and ineffective
signaling mechanisms, the government cannot easily shut down failing banks,
because it cannot accurately determine whether bank losses are caused by the
bank’s own bad lending decisions or by non-commercial loans the banks were
directed to make to state firms.  In turn, those state firms that received loans at
practically no cost have little incentive to ensure the productive use of capital.
Instead, these firms engage recklessly in dubious inter-firm transactions and
contribute to the growing problem of inter-enterprise—or “triangular”—debt,145
without fear of sustaining adverse consequences, precisely because there is no
credible threat of bankruptcy or other market-induced incentives to exit in the
event of enterprise failure.  There is, in fact, no true threat of bankruptcy possi-
ble because the financial information required to assess a firm’s viability is ei-
ther not available or not reliable.  Before the 1993 accounting reforms, for ex-
ample, Chinese industrial enterprises used more than seventy different
accounting methods.146  The cycle of soft budget constraints for both banks and
firms, the web of triangular inter-firm debt, and the lack of standard or uniform
accounting principles have made it increasingly difficult for decisionmakers to
distinguish solvent firms from insolvent firms and failing banks from profitable
banks.  It is additionally difficult to determine whether a firm’s financial loss is
caused by endogenous factors, such as managerial inefficiencies and predation,
or exogenous factors, such as industry-wide downturns, excessive taxation, or
even a firm’s high social welfare obligations.147  Given the high social costs of
large-scale unemployment, the central government has opted for the more po-
142. See BROADMAN, supra note 134, at 15.
143. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 21.
144. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 157-58 and accompanying
text.
145. See generally ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TA NO. 2271,
STATE ENTERPRISE INSOLVENCY REFORM 132-35 (1996).  Within the context of China, state firms
may run up a high level of receivables—which  may show as profit even though the customers do not
pay—in  effect extending credit to their customers, which are often other state firms.  This process, in
which one set of firms—the  producers—allow transactions to pile up as unsettled and outstanding re-
ceivables while another set of firms—the purchasers—extract “loans” from the former by merely de-
laying payment, may result in a complex configuration of debt between firms and across sectors, be-
tween state firms and state banks.  Since the beginning of reform, triangular debt has grown
tremendously: By 1994, it reached an estimated 600 billion renminbi.  See BROADMAN, supra note 134,
at 16.
146. See Dwight Perkins, Completing China’s Move to the Market, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring
1994, at 23-46.
147. State firms are often saddled with the high costs involved in providing state workers with medi-
cal care, housing, and other worker benefits through enterprise funds, such as worker housing construc-
tion projects and worker bonuses.  See Lee, supra note 64, at 194;  see also STEINFELD, supra note 59, at
66.
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litically expedient, albeit economically disastrous, option of continued firm
bailouts.148
In an environment characterized by a general lack of fiscal oversight, mana-
gerial autonomy often has meant managerial predation and resource
misallocation.  For example, responsibility contracts allowing managerial use of
firm profits above the state quota have “created incentives at the managerial
level for overproduction and reckless investment in plant capacity.”149  The shift
from compliance with plan output quotas to maximization of profit150 did force
managers to make profit maximization a high-priority objective,151 but it also
compelled some to adopt practices that allow the firm to “show” profit, whether
true or not.152  “Sales” are made to other firms, even if the latter are unable to
pay, and managers are more willing to roll over bad debt than to write them off
or even settle for less, because the latter options would result in an erosion of
nominal recorded profits.153  Asset valuation is routinely inflated.  Receivables
and credits, whether recoverable or not, are recorded as if they were the
equivalent of cash, and depreciation costs tend to be underestimated to assign a
more respectable book value to assets with minimal market value.  Within a
context of soft loans and ambiguous accounting standards, fundamentally weak
firms can nonetheless show profit and even expand, thereby drawing in even
more workers, which, in turn, makes the firms too politically significant to be
allowed to fail.  Ironically, firms that show high profits, inflated or otherwise,
are also those most susceptible to predatory taxes by the state and its multiple
arms.154  Some firms have responded to state predation by adopting an octopus-
like type of self defense—shooting ink and darkening the waters by creating
confounding webs of subsidiary chains, enterprise groups, affiliated collectives,
and private companies as a means of sheltering their assets from tax collectors.155
Tracking down assets buried within the bureaucratic channels of several hun-
dred smaller units is more difficult than merely taxing one large enterprise.
Additionally, collectives and private companies, until the 1994 tax law, were
taxed at a lower rate than state firms.156
148. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 64.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Indeed, the 1993 accounting reforms were implemented so that managers could exercise
greater control over firm assets, which meant that accounting standards had to reflect market-oriented
objectives.  Balance sheets produced under the new rules are expected to show firm assets, liabilities,
and equity.  See generally INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., CHINA’S
MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISE ASSETS: THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER 70 (1997).
151. For a positive assessment of this trend, see Gary H. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski, Enterprise
Reform in Chinese Industry, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1994, at 47-70.
152. Some studies have found that Chinese managers seek to avoid predatory taxation by declaring
losses and hiding profits.  See generally Shaoguang Wang, The Rise of the Regions: Fiscal Reform and
the Decline of Central State Capacity in China, in THE WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE:
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF POLITICAL DECLINE IN CHINA AND HUNGARY 87-113 (Andrew G. Walder
ed., 1995).
153. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 107.
154. See id. at 113.
155. See id. at 97-101.
156. See id. at 99.
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Enterprise autonomy unconstrained by an effective system of governance
has also led to “insider control” by managers who, sometimes in collusion with
workers, engage in “enterprise asset stripping” and other actions at the expense
of the state.157  During the first decade of reform, when a two-track pricing sys-
tem was first instituted, in an illicit scheme popularly called “official turn-
around,” officials and managers procured commodities at the lower, controlled
price for state enterprises within the planned economy and then “turned
around” and sold the same commodities at a higher price on the non-state and
private market.158  The frenzy to get rich, as proclaimed in the Party’s slogan that
“to get rich is glorious,”159 also led to the widespread use of public funds by in-
siders for personal speculation in such ventures as real estate and stock, with
gains pocketed by the insiders and losses absorbed by the affiliated state firm.160
Transferring control downward from central to local to firm, without more, did
not induce a behavioral change in the relevant economic actors, whether banks
or firms.  In fact, the opposite might be true under certain circumstances.  For
certain politically significant firms, such as those that once occupied the “com-
manding heights” of central planning and are themselves “cities within cities,”161
the threat of economic failures and potentially large-scale layoffs might itself be
a source of political strength, providing them with the leverage needed to ex-
tract additional loans from the state.162  Although the figures vary, it has been es-
timated that over the years, twenty percent of the government’s annual reve-
nues were siphoned into the more than sixty percent of the state-owned firms
that lost money.163
China, in other words, still faces a political and economic crisis that has no
simple solution.  At the state level, governmental decentralization, ostensibly
aimed at loosening the grip of the command economy, has exposed the firm to
intervention by a wide array of state actors in vertical and horizontal chains of
command.  Within the firm itself, governmental decentralization, the downward
transfer of rights, and the separation of the firm from the state have resulted in
more autonomy for managers as intended, but they also set into motion a web
157. See generally Yinyi Qian, Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control, 4
ECON. OF TRANSITION 427, 427-47 (1996).
158. See Binyan & Link, supra note 137, at 20.  Indeed, misuse of the dual price system was one of
the factors that fueled popular resentment against the government and contributed to the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations in 1989.  See Clague, supra note 63, at 8 n.2.
159. Henry Chu, In March Toward Capitalism, China Has Avoided Russia’s Path, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1998, at 4.
160. See Binyan & Link, supra note 137, at 20.
161. Anshan Iron and Steel is one example, with a core business that consists of 140 different facto-
ries and employs 220,000 employees.  In 1994, it had 110,000 retired workers for whom it still had to
provide pensions, housing, and medical care.  See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 98.
162. See id. at 109.
163. See Orville Schell & Todd Lappin, China Plays the Market, 1992 NATION 728; see also Xiao Yu,
Backing for State Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 1994, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, SCHINA File (noting that in 1992, $7.82 billion of China’s state expenditures—excluding addi-
tional “soft loans”—were used to subsidize state firm losses).
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of causally linked and distorted incentives that are difficult to rectify because of
the absence of internal and external controls.
After years of enterprise restructuring and reform that to this day fail to
produce a general environment in which state firms systemically exhibit market-
oriented behavior, China now is embarking on a more ideologically thorny path
of reform aimed at transforming the very ownership framework of the state sec-
tor itself—that is, the conversion of state firms into shareholding companies and
the sale of shares to private investors.  Yet, as the next section of this article
demonstrates, it is not enough simply to transfer some ownership rights to pri-
vate entities.  Such transfers must also be accompanied by (1) an internal gov-
ernance regime to ensure that owners can adequately monitor managers, and
that agents will in turn act in the interest of their principals; and (2) a set of ex-
ternal governance mechanisms—such as strict accounting standards, hard
budget constraints, financial disclosure requirements, or hostile takeovers and
bankruptcy proceedings—to minimize the problem of imperfect information.
V
STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM THROUGH STATE-SECTOR PRIVATIZATION
Two overriding reasons motivated China to convert its state enterprises into
shareholding companies and to establish a securities market: first, the chronic
inability of state firms to maintain financial self-sufficiency and solvency; and
second, the desire of the state to tap into a growing pool of private capital in the
non-state sector wholly outside of its control.  By establishing a shareholding
system, the government can alleviate the problem of state-sector insolvency,
while bringing the increasingly threatening reservoir of private capital within
the perimeters of the government-controlled state sector.  In other words, state-
sector privatization in China was motivated by a dearth of capital in the state
sector and, equally important, by what the government considered to be an ex-
cess of capital in the non-state sector.  As I analyze below, by ensuring that pri-
vatization will not strip the state of majority ownership in a state enterprise af-
ter its “privatization,” private capital will be put to state use and subjected to
state control under the euphemism of “corporatization” or “securitization.”
This can be compared to the situation in Russia and Eastern Europe, for exam-
ple, where there was essentially little domestic private capital, as there was no
viable non-state sector.  There, the problem the state encountered was not too
much private capital but rather, too little—in other words, how to sell assets to
raise much needed capital to domestic buyers who had almost no capital.164
Over the years, the prosperity of the non-state sector allowed China’s pri-
vate citizens to save large amounts of money. With one of the highest annual
164. Many Eastern European countries opted for the politically appealing voucher system, which
involves the free distribution of vouchers to citizens who can in turn exchange them for shares in the
privatized enterprises.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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saving rates in the world—approximately thirty percent165—private surplus capi-
tal at one point constituted approximately 1.3 trillion yuan or $260 billion,166 al-
though other sources put the amount at $310 billion,167  with an estimated $200
billion idle in the domestic banking system and another $100 billion concealed
outside the system, under mattresses, for example, by people distrustful of
banks.168  This amount is even more startling and—from the government’s point
of view— is politically threatening when compared to the value of state-held as-
sets, which totaled about $240 billion.169
Despite China’s high savings rate, “[s]aving remains an unattractive pros-
pect because the bank interest rates are typically low (often lower than the rate
of inflation).”170  From the perspective of the individual saver, then, the prospect
of receiving much higher returns through securities investment is an appealing
one.  From the perspective of the government, establishing a shareholding sys-
tem to finance public debt and to coax private savings into an arena susceptible
to the control of the state is equally appealing.  At the same time, with increas-
ing concerns that surplus capital also could spark inflationary spending, the
government believes that securities also can be used as a strategy for cooling a
possibly overheated economy, “as money could be steered toward investment
rather than consumer spending.”171
Like its other market-oriented measures, China’s conversion of private sav-
ings into investment capital must be contained within the perimeters of market
socialism.  Thus, capital extracted from Chinese personal savings was converted
initially into debt instruments that do not threaten socialist ownership and later
into limited minority interests that do not threaten the state’s role as majority
shareholder of state enterprises,172 resulting in the wrong sort of regulation: po-
165. See Schell & Lappin, supra note 163, at 730.  Other sources put the savings rate at about 39%.
See, e.g., Money and Banking: 11.4 Securities and Bond Markets, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, CHINA File [hereinafter 11.4 Securities].
166. See Black Market Forex Deals Bleed Economy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 28, 1993, at 2,
available in LEXIS, News File; Schell & Lappin, supra note 163, at 730.
167. See Business Briefing: China, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1, 1993, at 83, available in 1993 WL
FEER; see also STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA, supra note 85 (estimating household bank depos-
its and financial assets for 1993 at about 1 trillion yuan and 2 trillion yuan, respectively, versus the 3
trillion yuan estimated for total state assets.)
168. See China, EUROMONEY: HANDBOOK OF WORLD ECONOMIES AND INVESTMENT
OPPORTUNITIES, Sept. 1992, at 121, 124 (Supp.); JOHN R. GUARDIANO, EXPLODING THE MYTHS
ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA (Heritage Found. Report No. 930, Mar. 9, 1993).
169. See Business Briefing, supra note 167, at 83.
170. 11.4 Securities, supra note 165.
171. Paul Schroeder, Rebuilding China’s Securities Markets, CHINA BUS. REV., May-June 1991, at
20, 21; see also Gong, supra note 33, at 36.
172. Scholars, practitioners, and reformers in China defended the securities system as being com-
patible with and complementary to socialism.  “The shareholding system has emerged under the capi-
talist system but it is not the exclusive right of capitalism.  Rather, it is the product of the socialization
and commercialization of production.  It may exist under the capitalist system but it can also exist un-
der the socialist system and serve socialism.”  Qian, supra note 110, at 82 (quoting Xiao Zuoji, Shixin
Shehui Zhuyi Gongyouzhi De Xinshi [On the Forms of Realizing Socialist Ownership], 2 JINGJI
YANJIU 38 (1992)).
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litical regulation to serve the state’s desire to maintain control, rather than the
necessary market regulation to transform state actors into market actors.
As I argue below, the securities system has been grossly distorted not only
by the state’s insistence on retaining supermajority shareholder status, but also
by its unwillingness to allow private enterprises access to the securities market
itself.  Unlike the first stage of reform, in which sound economic reasons justi-
fied the deferral of state-sector privatization in favor of first creating a private
or non-state sector, the current stage of state-sector privatization reform reflects
less rational economic policy than crass political manipulation.  As I have ar-
gued throughout, China’s failure at state-sector reform—like Russia’s state-
sector privatization efforts—has been caused by the absence of an institutional
framework necessary to ensure market-oriented behavior and reduce transac-
tion costs.  Thus, in its current phase of reform, in which it finally decides to
commit resources to the creation of property rights by privatizing its state en-
terprises, China’s  failure to create the regulatory and governance regime
needed to make property rights work has, in fact, resulted in a circular replica-
tion of the problem it is attempting to remedy in the first place: the very ab-
sence of property rights itself.  In other words, China’s failure to establish in the
state sector a regulatory framework for its newly instituted market and private-
property regime has led to principal/agency problems that have prevented
“owners” from acting as true owners.  Additionally, transaction-cost problems
have prevented a reallocation of property rights—to the minimal extent that
property rights can be said to exist at all—to the highest-valued use.  The argu-
ment I set forth below is that even a minimalist, Delaware-type model of corpo-
rate governance, if adopted, would be desirable and highly effective in trans-
forming the behavior of privatized state-sector enterprises.
In the mid-1980s, the central government’s decision to restrict the money
supply forced many state enterprises, especially those not politically favored or
connected, to find new ways to finance themselves.  At the beginning, China’s
securities issuance was limited strictly to internal bonds such as workers’ bonus
or incentive shares.  The rationale was well expressed by one worker in the
state-run People’s Bank of China:  “Most of our shareholders will be workers.
There is no contradiction.”173
The government also relied on government-issued bonds to subsidize its
own capital shortages.174  Debt instruments void of equity interests allowed the
government to raise needed capital without undermining state ownership and
control of state enterprises.  After more than thirty years, the issuance of long-
term state treasury bonds in 1981 signified the reestablishment of China’s
Liu Hongru, Deputy Director of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy, stated, “We
are a socialist country, and we must hold fast to public ownership of assets, and to the principle of com-
bining a market economy and a planned economy. Under these conditions we will create securities
markets.”  Juliet Sychrava, China: Marches to a Changing Tune, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1, 1990, at 50.
173. Peter Goodspeed, “Capitalist Oppression” is Back as Shanghai Market Re-Opens, TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 16, 1990, at F1.
174. See OVERHOLT, supra note 60, at 151-56.
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securities market.175  By the end of the 1980s, “the forms of state-issued bonds
had proliferated: they included government bonds, treasury bonds, special
project bonds, and value-guaranteed bonds with interest rates indexed to
inflation,”176 eventually leading to the emergence in 1988 of secondary market
trading.177 From 1981 to 1988, bonds alone were the driving force behind the
securities market.178  Indeed, the State Council promulgated a notice in 1987 that
ordered that stocks may be issued only by a select number of approved
collective enterprises and that state enterprises may not issue stock, only bonds
and other debt securities.179
The relative success of bonds as a fundraising device paved the way for the
subsequent implementation by the government of a 1984 World Bank proposal
that a firm’s  “assets . . . be divided into shares and owned by several
government departments.”180  Under this scheme, state enterprises are
converted into shareholding companies whose shares are cross-held by other
state enterprises with sufficient capital surplus to experiment in capital
investment.  In guidelines issued by the State Commission for Restructuring the
Economic System, the government has most vigorously embraced this form of
“legal person” shareholding, whereby shares of one state firm are held by other
state firms.181
China’s experiment with shareholding has surpassed that proposed by the
World Bank to permit, for example, even private equity interests in privatized
state enterprises.  Under the 1992 Opinion on Standards for Companies
Limited By Shares,182 issued pursuant to the Share Enterprise Trial Measures,183
although a company may issue common or preferred shares that are similar to
those issued in the United States, its shares must be additionally divided into
various categories of shares based on the shareholder’s status: state shares, legal
175. See Christian Bauta, China: Investment Banking, Industry Sector Analysis (visited Oct. 12,
2000) <http://www. tradeport.org/ts/countries/china/isa/isar0068.html>.
176. OVERHOLT, supra note 60, at 152.
177. See id. at 152, 154.  Experimenting markets for bond trading were established in seven, and
later, 54 cities. By 1990, a nationwide, computerized bond-trading network, the Securities Trading
Automated Quotations Systems (“STAQS”) was opened.  See id. at 155.  
178. See Qian, supra note 110, at 66 n.15.
179. See Jia Zhao & Li Qian, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regulation, Issues and Pros-
pects, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15, 1992, at 8; see also Fang Liufang, China’s Corporatization
Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 156 n.16 (1995) (describing a State Council administra-
tive order that prohibited state enterprises from issuing shares to the public and specifying which state
organization shall be responsible for the supervision of share issuance: the Head Office of the People’s
Bank of China for issuance by state enterprises of more than 30 million shares (in renminbi) and the
local branch of the People’s Bank for the issuance of less).
180. Qian, supra note 110, at 75.
181. See Fang, supra note 179, at 156.
182. See Opinion on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares, reprinted and translated in 3
CHINA L. FOR BUS.: BUS. REG. (CCH Austl.) (issued on May 15, 1992 by the State Commission for
Restructuring the Economic System).
183. Trial Measures on Share-Formulated Enterprises, 2 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS.: BUS. REG.
(CCH Austl.), ¶ 13-570 (issued on May 15, 1992, by the State Commission for Restructuring the Eco-
nomic System, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China
and the State Production Office).
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person shares, and individual shares,184 with the last category further divided
into A shares, which can be bought by Chinese citizens in local currency, and B
shares, which can be bought only by foreign parties in foreign currency.185  These
classifications have resulted, as I argue below, in excessive state control of the
market.186  The government has sought to retain political control in two primary
ways: first, in the listing procedures employed to restrict the issuance of shares,
and second, in the trading regulations designed to limit the types of shares
deemed tradeable.
Until 2000, the central government, through the China Securities Regula-
tory Commission (“CSRC”), the agency responsible for the execution and en-
forcement of policies created by the China Securities Commission, still set an
annual capital quota for the total value of shares that can be issued.187  Thus, an
enterprise not only had to apply for a public offering and satisfy certain stan-
dard criteria—such as those relating to financial auditing, disclosure of company
assets, and  underwriting contracts188—but also had to apply for an assignment of
a share quota.  The conditions concerning the issuance of quotas, however, were
not within the control or purview of the enterprise because they were a reflec-
tion of and dependent on the political process that determined how quotas were
to be allocated—how much and to which local governments and central gov-
ernmental organs.189
Once a quota was established, each province was allocated its portion of the
total allowance, and the province made its own selection190 among local compa-
184. See Opinion, supra note 182, arts. 23, 24, 29.  The provinces had also enacted their own meas-
ures dealing with the issuance and trading of shares, which utilize a similar system of share classifica-
tion. See, e.g., Provisional Measures of Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and
Trading of Shares, reprinted in 14 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Sept. 15, 1992, at 21 (effective June 15, 1991).
See also Article 33 (stating that shares shall be divided into state, legal person, and individual shares
and that the state shall retain a controlling interest in a state firm); Article 45 (stating that state shares
are not transferable); Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back?  A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN. L. 127, 158 & nn.112-13.
185. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 220-235 and accompanying text.
187. See Fang, supra note 179, at 177-81; see also Bauta, supra note 175.  After this article was com-
pleted and while it was prepared for final publication, the government announced that “a selection pro-
cess based on legislation and practice overseas would replace the quota system.”  B-Share Market En-
joys Reform and Measured Revival, INT’L BRIEFING, Aug. 3, 2000; see Winston Yau & Eric Ng, Beijing
Ready to Drop Curbs on Share Issues, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 2000, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, SCHINA File (“[R]emoval of the share-issuing quota meant that there would be no
ceiling on the amount of shares—A and B—to be issued every year, so more fund-raising exercises
could take place for as long as the market could accept them.”); China Fully Prepared for a “Second
Stock Market,” BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 17, 2000.
188. See Fang, supra note 179, at 181-82 (citations omitted).
189. See id. at 183-85.
190. There have been complaints that the CSRC has too much power and that it is not just approv-
ing but selecting the companies which are then allowed to list.  See Henny Sender, Shareholder-Rights
Case Points Up CSRC’s Power, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at 13 (A Hong Kong attorney com-
plained that “‘[the CSRC] say they are just approving, but in fact they are selecting the companies
which are allowed to list.’”); Ian Johnson, China Pulls Out All Stops to Coax Growth, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., July 6, 1999, at 1 (“Despite hints that rules will change, government bureaucrats still select compa-
nies for listing.”); Anthony Zaloom & Liu Hongchuan, A Legal Framework for Securities: Chinese Se-
curities Law Finally Takes a Step Forward, CHINA BUS. REV. May 1, 1999, at 26, 28 (“[A] company
LANCAO_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:39 PM
48 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
nies that applied for share issuance—based on the size of its shares quota and
on the sectoral or industrial significance of the company applying.191  Whether
the official quota system did, in fact, control and determine the amount of share
issuance is itself a separate matter, however.  For example, although the total
issuance quota for the country was one billion renminbi in 1992, one hundred
companies in some of the major provinces alone were permitted to issue 8.98
billion renminbi worth of shares to the public.192  The system thus appeared arbi-
trary and capricious, and there was the sense that the state-controlled and state-
supervised selection process furthered less the economic interests of the in-
vesting public than the vested political interests of the well-connected firms or
those in sectors favored and promoted by the government.193 While it is too
early to know whether the government will, in practice, allow the issuance of
shares to be determined by market considerations rather than the strictures,
formal or informal, of a state plan, its decision to eliminate share quotas does
show that it recognizes the need to minimize the government’s involvement in
the process of share issuance and the appearance of political favoritism.
Besides favoring certain state firms over other less politically appealing
ones, the securities system also favors state firms in general over private firms,
even though the government amended the language in the Constitution in 1999
from “[t]he private sector complements the socialist public ownership system”
to “[t]he individual, private and other non-state sectors are an important com-
ponent of the socialist market economy.”194  Because the government no longer
directly subsidizes state firms, its aim is to use the stock markets as a fund-
raising vehicle for state enterprises.  Private firms, therefore, are essentially
locked out of the stock market:195  “Official policy is to use the stock market
mainly to raise money for state companies.”196  The very companies that are in
seeking a listing must first be selected by provincial or ministerial offices that must fill yearly, central
government-set quotas”).
191. See Bauta, supra note 175; see also Securities: Doubts Grow About Command-Style Controls, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 12, 1998, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File (dis-
cussing the politicized nature of the quota system).
192. See Fang, supra note 179, at 196.
193. See Bauta, supra note 175; see also China: Individual Businesses Protected, CHINA DAILY, Jan.
7, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library.
194. James Kynge, Beijing Fillips for Dynamic Private Sector, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at 7; see also
China: NPC to Consider Drafting Private Protection Law, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 5, 1999.
195. See Chinese Private Enterprises Sweep Up Listed Firms, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, June 17,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Library; Mark O’Neill, New Hope Boosts War Chest for Asian Feed-
grain Battle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 13, 1998, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library,
SCHINA File [hereinafter O’Neill, War Chest] (discussing the debate over whether private companies
should have more access to capital, through bank finance and stock market listings); Mark O’Neill, Pri-
vate Companies Gear Up for Easing of Foreign, Local Listing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 3, 1998,
at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File [hereinafter O’Neill, Private War Companies
Gear Up].
196. O’Neill, War Chest, supra note 195, at 4.  Liu Ji, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of So-
cial Sciences, for example, opposes listing on the public exchanges by family-owned firms, because it
would give public money to single families.  See id.; see also Dexter Robert & Mark L. Clifford, The
Party’s Over on China’s Bourses, BUS. WK., Nov. 15, 1999, at 280B (Because ailing state firms are fa-
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the more dynamic non-state sector thus are those most starved of capital be-
cause, under the current system, capital is not allocated to the most economi-
cally efficient user.
Indeed, only a few private companies have received CSRC approval to list
on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges,197 with many others, such
as China’s largest privately owned information technology firms—the Stone
Group—planning for a stock market listing within the next few years.198  Only in
mid-1999 did serious discussion take place about allowing non-state companies,
such as collectives and private companies, to list, at least on the foreign cur-
rency “B” share index to “enable them to raise funds via foreign portfolio in-
vestment, with foreign direct investment declining . . . and bank lending very
much concentrated in the state-owned sector.”199  As a result, many private
vored for listing to raise capital for the government, “markets are awash in companies stuck with ineffi-
cient management and excess inventories and workers.”).
197. See Rowan Callick, Yuan for the Money, Zhu for the Show, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Aug. 3,
1999, at 14 (“Only about 30 listed companies are privately owned.”); Mark O’Neill, Eager Mainland
Firms Await CSRC Approval, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 1999, at 3, available in LEXIS, News
Library, SCHINA File; Peter Wonacott, China’s Securities Law Criticized for Failing to Empower
Holders, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1999, at 24 (“Only a handful of the 827 companies listed in China
are considered private.”).  But see China to Allow Privately Owned Companies to be Listed on Stock
Market, CHINAONLINE, Nov. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library (“Under China’s revision to
its securities law, a company’s ownership will no longer be a criterion in selecting companies to be listed
on the exchanges.”); Lu Ning, Counting on the Private Sector in a Socialist Market Economy, BUS.
TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 4, 1999, at 6 (with the new securities law, which came into effect on July 1,
1999, “private businesses, originally banned from listing on China’s stock exchanges, are now allowed
to do that.”).  In practice, however, “few investors believe the government will do anything to jeopard-
ize the dominant position of the state sector.”  Shanghai Shares Close Morning Higher Amid Institu-
tional Buying, AFX EUR. FOCUS, Jan. 5, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library. The government
“may say that private companies will have the same access to the stock market, but if a private firm
really asked for a listing, it would probably still have to fulfill all kinds of extra conditions and proce-
dures.”  Id. (quoting unnamed analyst).  In other words, the prevailing view among investors is that the
practice of discriminating against private companies remains, despite laws to the contrary.  See Justin
Doebele, Chinese Capitalism Gets a Face, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 175.
198. See China’s Biggest Private IT Company to Seek Listing, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, July 8,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Library.  After years of being squeezed out of the credit market by the
government’s state banks and the securities markets, private companies, or at least those that are in the
high-technology sphere, are to be granted priority in listing on the stock markets.  See Kynge, Beijing
Fillips, supra note 194, at 7.
199. This Week in Asia: 5 July 1999, MACQUARIE BANK THIS WEEK IN ASIA, available in Quest
Economics Database; see also China: Bourses Decline as Correction Happens, CHINA DAILY, June 4,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Library; Winston Yau, SAR Investors Seek Better Transparency and
Efficiency, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 1999, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA
File. The removal of restrictions would also allow foreign-funded companies to list on China’s stock
exchanges and issue “B” shares.  See Christine Chan, Beijing Prepares Steps for Boost to B-Shares Mar-
ket, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 17, 1999, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
“A” shares, traded on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, are available only to Chinese
citizens and are quoted in renminbi. “B” shares, which represent identical ownership rights as “A”
shares, are available only to holders of foreign passports and are quoted in U.S. dollars in Shanghai and
Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen.  The B share market is less than one-fortieth the size of the A share
market and generally attracts fewer companies.  See Simon Davies & James Harding, How Foreigners
Are Hamstrung: China Dealing Restrictions Slash Opportunities, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1998, at 2.  Al-
though both A and B shares may be issued and listed by the same mainland Chinese company, pricing
for the A shares is much higher than that for the B shares because A shares have outperformed B
shares, possibly because companies that issue B shares are subject to international accounting rules,
and B shares profits may be more realistic than those claimed by A share companies that are subject to
LANCAO_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:39 PM
50 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
companies, starved of capital needed for expansion, have searched for other, of-
ten more circuitous, ways to finance themselves, for example, by applying to list
on Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”), a secondary market
aimed at small and mid-size high-tech companies that opened in 2000.200  Even
then, however, “‘[h]igh-technology mainland firms that meet the requirements
for listing must [still] obtain an ‘exit approval permit’ before listing there’”201—a
requirement that is supposed, as a mainland Chinese official put it, to “prevent
‘a flood of refugee companies’ into the Hong Kong market.”202 In other in-
stances, private companies on mainland China have had to circumvent the pro-
hibition against listing by non-state companies by buying shares of companies
that are already listed.203  After years of seeking permission to list on the Shang-
hai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the Clever Software Company, a private
Beijing company and one of the largest developers of education software in
China, decided to become a principal shareholder in the already-listed Acheng
Iron and Steel Company by buying twenty-eight percent of its shares, thereby
gaining access to the stock exchanges.204
less stringent Chinese accounting standards. The B shares market has thus been sluggish, which ex-
plains why the government may need to take innovative measures such as those described in the text to
increase its appeal.  See id.
200. GEM got its official start in early 2000, to raise capital for high-technology companies.  See In-
dia: Price Tag On New Rule on Selective Disclosure, BUS. LINE, Aug. 27, 2000, available in 2000WL
2494924; Angela Mackay, GEM Falters As Stocks Are Hit, SUNDAY BUS., June 11, 2000, at 17.  The
general sentiment in mainland China is that “‘[u]nder the principle of one country, two systems, Hong
Kong has the right to set up such a market and its stock exchange the right to control it.’”  O’Neill, su-
pra note 197, at 3.  See also Sheri Prasso, A Bourse of Their Own, BUS. WK., Aug. 30, 1999, at 26.  Hong
Kong’s GEM, a Nasdaq-style market “designed specifically for companies without proven track rec-
ords, will enable them to finance growth and offer venture capitalists an exit route when it’s time to
cash out.”  Id. at 26.  Indeed, under the listing requirements for GEM, a company must be in operation
for at least two years but does not necessarily have to demonstrate profitability.  Compare this to listing
under the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, which requires a company to show that it has been in busi-
ness for more than three years and has earned more than $6.5 million in profits.
201. O’Neill, supra note 197, at 3 (quoting an unnamed CSRC official).
202. Id.  The CSRC’s chief adviser, Anthony Neoh, rejected a proposal to allow private mainland
companies to list on GEM merely upon notification to the CSRC of their intention to list overseas.  See
Hui Yuk-Min, Listing Hopefuls Bypass Regulator, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1999, at 4, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File (discussing how private mainland companies plan to re-
structure themselves into foreign companies in order to bypass this requirement).  However, the CSRC
later assured that it would not place any quota on the number of companies allowed listing in Hong
Kong, and would “streamline the approval process for mainland listings in Hong Kong to support
GEM’s development.”  China to Support Mainland Listings on Hong Kong’s GEM, AFX-ASIA, Oct.
14, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library.  Mainland private companies, however, had hoped “that
the Hong Kong exchange alone could judge which firms could list, with an obligation to inform the
CRSC but without giving it veto power.”  Mark O’Neill, GEM Rush Underlines Private-sector Plight, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 1999, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.  Inter-
estingly, in the middle of 2000, the CSRC announced that China planned to launch its own mainland
GEM “to help high-tech startups and private firms raise money.”  Chinese Plan Stock Market for High-
Techs, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, July 25, 2000, at C6.
203. See Chinese Private Enterprises Sweep Up Listed Firms, supra note 195.
204. See id.; see also Callick, supra note 197, at 14.  According to research conducted by Shenzhen
Dapeng Securities Ltd., 15 private enterprises became main shareholders of listed firms in 1998, com-
pared to seven in 1997, and a much smaller number before that.  See Callick, supra note 197; O’Neill,
supra note 195, at 3 (explaining that private firms unable to list have resorted to controlling listed firms
through takeovers).
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Like private mainland companies, foreign firms, even blue chips whose list-
ings would bring the stock exchanges prestige, face similar obstacles in their at-
tempts to list on the Chinese stock exchange.  In 1994, after years of negotia-
tions, the German car manufacturer Daimler-Benz confirmed its plans, which
later proved to be futile, to become the first foreign company to list on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange.205  Unilever has been restructuring its mainland op-
erations to secure permission to list on either of the two Chinese exchanges, al-
though it is generally believed that the Chinese government remains wary of
allowing foreign companies access to its domestic securities market.206  Because
one of the primary objectives of the stock market is to provide cash for the con-
stantly cash-starved state sector, it is not surprising that China is reluctant to
allow non-state companies, whether domestic or foreign, the right to access
Chinese domestic capital, which the government believes should be reserved for
more state-centered strategic objectives.207 As a result, the government’s reac-
tion to the inability of the B shares market to attract as much foreign exchange
as originally contemplated208 was not to improve the B shares market,209 which
would benefit B shareholders.  Rather, the government chose to increase its ac-
cess to foreign markets and foreign currency by listing Chinese state enterprises
on the stock exchanges of Hong Kong and New York,210 which raise foreign
capital for the listed state firms.
205. See Foo Choy Peng, Play the Waiting Game While Seeking Mainland Listing, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 14, 1999, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File; Christine Chan,
Mainland Stock Markets Fear an Exodus of Funds, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 1, 1994, at 7, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
206. See Peng, supra note 205, at 7.  As of October 2000 when this article was prepared for publica-
tion, Unilever was still not listed on China’s stock exchanges.  See Stock, XINHUA ECON. NEWS SERV.,
Sept. 5, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library.
207. See Chan, supra note 205, at 7; see also Stock, supra note 206 (discussing worries over allowing
foreign companies to list on Chinese exchanges “because when the capital is limited, high-quality for-
eign-funded enterprises will divert large amounts of funds, challenging Chinese enterprises in raising
capital”).
208. See supra note 199 and infra note 209.
209. As noted, it is only recently that the government announced plans to allow private companies
the right to list on the B shares market in an effort to increase the number of listings, which the gov-
ernment hopes would in turn make the B shares market more attractive to investors on the global mar-
ket.  See Winston Yau, SAR Investors Seek Better Transparency and Efficiency, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 26, 1999, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File; see also supra note 199 and
accompanying text.  For years, as compared to the A shares market, the B shares market has been slug-
gish, resulting in a troubling discrepancy in valuation between the two markets as A shares trade at a
higher value than B shares of the same company.  This discrepancy exists because Chinese investors
with an excess of yuan, faced with a dearth of domestic investment possibilities, are eager to buy up al-
most any domestically issued financial instruments.  By contrast, foreign investors, who have a much
broader investment opportunity, are less willing to put up with the erratic and murky Chinese securities
market and thus less eager to buy up B shares issued by Chinese firms.  See Inefficient Markets?,
ECONOMIST, July 31, 1993, at 70.  To make the B shares market more attractive and more liquid, it has
been suggested over the years, without much success, that Chinese investors holding foreign currency
be allowed to buy B shares, or even that the A shares and B shares markets be merged.  See Christine
Chan, Calls Growing to End China’s Share Classes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 3, 1993, at 1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
210. In 1992, China released a list of nine companies selected to be among the first mainland-based
companies to seek direct listing in Hong Kong, and in 1993, earmarked an additional 20 companies for
international listing.  See  Julia Sze, The Allure of B Shares, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 42, 48.
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State dominance of the securities market has resulted in severe distortions
in fundamental ways.  The fundraising functions mandated by the government
have overwhelmed other basic governance objectives, such as market transpar-
ency and liquidity, as well as managerial accountability and shareholder’s
rights.211  The case of Ma’anshan Iron and Steel Company (“Magang”), one of
the larger, flagship state firms that qualified for listing on the Hong Kong stock
exchange in 1993,212 proves this point.  The company was divided into two parts:
one a state-owned holding company, Magang Holding, into which all the com-
pany’s less profitable mining operations, its housing agencies, healthcare facili-
ties, and schools were transferred, and the other a public stock company, Ma-
gang Steel, which holds all of the profitable iron and steel production units.
Before the shares were offered to the public, Magang Holding was given a
62.5% ownership stake, thus allowing the holding company, as the representa-
tive of the state, to retain a controlling share block.213
Within a year of its Hong Kong debut in which it raised $505 million,214 Ma-
gang exhibited many of the pathologies typical of large state enterprises, such as
financial irregularities and increasing short-term debt, including taxes owed to
the state.  Serious breaches of corporate formalities allowed the company to
present an inaccurate financial picture to investors.  Through much of 1994,
Magang Steel paid out dividends to its individual investors but not to Magang
Holding.  The dividend withholdings were merely deemed interest-free loans,
and as dividends were being paid out on less than forty percent of outstanding
shares, this allowed Magang Steel artificially to inflate its declared dividends
and, at the same time, artificially to deflate its costs by reneging on its various
contractual obligations to Magang Holding.
Despite being a controlling shareholder in the stock company, Magang
Holding could not enforce its rights because it could not act as a true owner.
Both the general manager and the party secretary of Magang Holding were ap-
pointed chairman and vice chairman of the board of Magang Steel, respectively,
211. The CSRC has received numerous complaints about company compliance with basic regula-
tions.  See Christine Chan, Quality of Listed Stocks Must Be Raised, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 22,
1994, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.  For example, according to officials at the
privatized Shanghai Vacuum Electron Device Company, although the Shanghai municipal government
owns 75% of its stock, the firm has never been paid for the shares, but it must nonetheless issue divi-
dends on them.  See Paul Schroeder, Rebuilding China’s Securities Markets, CHINA BUS. REV., May-
June 1991, at 20, 21.  Shareholder complaints often center on a company’s failure to comply with its
own original plans for share issue proceeds and to keep shareholders informed.  See Lui Weiling, China:
Wariness Reigns Among Stock Investors, BUS. WK. (China Daily Supp.), Jan. 30, 1994, available in
LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE file.
In 1995, after Tsingtao Brewery raised U.S. $190 million in an initial public offering, it was discov-
ered that company managers had taken U.S. $71.2 million that had been earmarked for expansion proj-
ects and loaned it to other firms.  See Craig S. Smith, Chinese Brewer’s Stock is Suspended, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 12, 1995, at A11.
212. See The Rise of the Red Chip, EUROMONEY: INT’L INVESTORS’ GUIDE TO ASIAN ISSUERS &
CAPITAL MARKETS (Supp.), Dec. 1993, at 23, 23.
213. See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 146.  My discussion of the Magang study is drawn from id. at
124-64.
214. See The Rise of the Red Chip, supra note 212, at 23.
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so that the top two people at the holding company also shared the top two posi-
tions on the stock company’s board.  Even so, they had no right to appoint or
fire their subordinates in the stock company—such as the general manager—
because those positions could be filled only by provincial government appoint-
ees.215  Thus, although it is a clearly defined majority owner, Magang Holding
was not granted the kind of control over appointments and removals to allow it
to perform its monitoring and enforcement functions over Magang Steel’s man-
agement.216
Nor could it sue Magang Steel, according to Magang Holding officials, be-
cause of loopholes in China’s corporate code.217  Indeed, in a recent court case
brought for the first time by an individual shareholder against a Chinese firm
for damages caused by the firm’s false disclosure, the shareholder sued the
company for losses sustained as a result of the company’s inflated earnings, fig-
ures declared when it sought to list on the Shanghai stock exchange.  The
chairman and chief financial officer of the company had been sentenced to jail
for fraud.  The court, however, declined to hear the suit brought by the individ-
ual investor, holding that it was the purview of the CSRC, not individual share-
holders, to address illegal acts.218  In fact, the new national law on securities, ef-
fective July 1, 1999, does not explicitly create a private cause of action for
shareholders.  While Chapter XI, entitled “Legal Responsibilities,” contains
many provisions setting forth various administrative penalties for violations of
the securities law, including confiscation by the state of illegal earnings, fines,
revocations of business licenses, and even criminal liability, it fails to provide
215. The politicization behind China’s system of managerial appointment remains a problem.  See,
e.g., Anthony Neoh, Rethinking Asia: China Strengthens Its Markets, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 14, 1999,
at 69, available in WESTLAW, News Library (“Most listed companies are managed by former govern-
ment officials who are still learning the skills needed to run profitable businesses.”); China Regulator
Sets New Trade Rules for Money-Losing Companies, DOW JONES BUS. NEWS, July 5, 1999 (“More than
90% of listed companies are controlled by the government, and most company managers are appointed
by state-run parent companies.”).
216. See, e.g., Gordon Chang, Revitalizing China’s State-Owned Enterprises, DOW JONES NEWS
SERV., July 6, 1999 (Even though there are about 900 state-owned enterprises listed on the various
stock exchanges, “partial privatization has had limited benefits.  Stock listings have raised vast amounts
of money in public markets . . . [but] [m]any listed [state-owned enterprises] are still struggling because
management has not improved.”).
217. The legal representative of a shareholding company is the chairman of the board.  The legal
representative of a state-owned enterprise is its general manager.  In Magang’s case, the general man-
ager of Magang Holding is the same person as the chairman of the board of Magang Steel.  Under Chi-
nese law, the plaintiff would be the same as the defendant, and the suit would be unable to go forward.
See STEINFELD, supra note 59, at 156; see also Henny Sender, Shareholder Rights Case Points Up
CSRC’s Power, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at 13, available in WESTLAW, News Library (de-
scribing case in which a Chinese court declined to hear a suit brought by  a plaintiff shareholder against
a Shanghai-listed company for false disclosure; the court held instead that it was the CSRC’s sole pur-
view to address illegal acts).
218. See Henny Sender, In Hong Kong: China’s Court Ruling Shows Market Reforms’ Slow Pace,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at 13 (stating that the new securities law passed in July 1999 does not
grant an explicit individual cause of action and even suggests that any compensation for losses resulting
from false disclosures, for example, is owed to the government); Chang, supra note 216.
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for civil remedies, such as derivative suits, that would allow shareholders to sue
the company and its directors and officers.219
Equally important, Chinese norms and customs governing the interaction
between the holding company and the stock company also discourage the initia-
tion of such a suit, especially because of the stock company’s high-profile status
as a national experiment in corporatization and public offerings.  As one of the
first and largest state enterprises to issue stock internationally, the value of Ma-
gang Steel’s shares on the stock markets had to be maintained.  Thus, Magang
Steel was allowed to renege on dividend and other contractual obligations to its
parent holding company to meet its own expansion and modernization costs.
Magang Holding, on the other hand, had to continue meeting its own obliga-
tions, such as debt related to its mining operations and taxes owed due to vari-
ous pre-arranged tax submission targets by borrowing from state banks, just as
it did prior to the implementation of shareholding.  And so continued the cycle
of soft budget constraints and inter-firm debt.
Thus, even after privatization, the stock company exhibited much of its pre-
privatization behavioral pattern.  Released from the dictates of the plan, yet
unaccountable to and unmonitored by any true owner, it seized upon new op-
portunities to capture rents.  Agency problems persist because of non-existent
or ineffective monitoring, whether through corporate governance mechanisms
or through legal machineries that allow shareholder rights to be enforced.  In-
ter-firm debt, distorted financial flows, and soft budget constraints persist due
to the complete absence of or lapses in corporate formalities among affiliated
firms.  Without substantial changes in the firm’s institutional environment and
unless critical governance issues are implemented, ownership restructuring
merely results in the duplication of preexisting distortions, even though privati-
zation has been initiated with the full intention of replacing the multiplicity of
vertical and horizontal state agencies claiming authority over the firm with a
clearer system of shareholding.  Therefore, introducing private owners into an
environment in which the state bureaucracy, including its banking and legal sys-
tem, continues to act in politicized and noncommercial ways will almost cer-
tainly guarantee failure in most respects, except of course, in the most short-
term of objectives—capital infusion from the domestic and foreign shareholding
public.
To further ensure continued political control over and domination of the
stock markets, Chinese law also classifies shares by reference to the status of the
shareholders: state shares, legal person shares, and individual shares. State
shares are purchased with state assets by governmental departments and usually
constitute fifty percent or more of all issued shares,220 which means that the state
219. See Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the Sixth Session of the
Ninth National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Dec. 29, 1998 (effective July 1, 1999) (visited
Oct. 11, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal/laws_regs/important_documents.asp>. Civil
remedies, however, might be inferred from Article 207, which provides that in the event a violator of
the securities law cannot pay both administrative and civil fines, civil compensation shall be paid first.
220. See Qian, supra note 110, at 87; Fang, supra note 179, at 201 (noting that "[u]ntil August 1993,
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is a majority shareholder in most instances.221  Legal person shares are owned by
entities such as companies and institutions—usually other state enterprises.222
Individual shares are held by employees or individual investors from the gen-
eral public.223  Only individual shares of listed companies can be traded on the
stock exchanges.224  State shares and legal person shares, on the other hand, are
nontransferable, thus ensuring that the state and its agencies retain their respec-
tive dominance.225  For example, in 1996, when the Shanghai-listed Beijing Light
Bus sold a twenty-five percent stake in non-transferable legal person shares to
two Japanese companies, Isuzu Motors and Itochu, the government allowed the
transaction only reluctantly and promptly decreed that no similar transactions
would be permitted in the future.226  Similarly, when the board of directors of
Harbin Pharmaceutical, a Shanghai-listed company, approved a transfer of fifty-
two million state shares to individual shareholders in 1993, the CSRC allowed
the transfer only after it issued a stern warning and only after it determined that
out of all the 15.47 billion (face value) shares listed on the Shanghai Exchange by 70 companies, 68%
were State shares, 12% were legal person shares, 10% were transferable individual shares . . .").
221. See Karby Leggett, China to Put New Stress on Quality in Deciding Which Firms to List, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1999, at 22; Neoh, supra note 215, at 69; Zaloom & Hongchuan, supra note 190, at
26, 27; Callick, supra note 197, at 14.
222. See Fang, supra note 179, at 202-03.
223. See supra notes 184, 185, 199 (A shares and B shares are individual shares, but A shares, de-
nominated in local currency, are held by individual domestic investors and B shares, denominated in
United States or Hong Kong dollars, are held by foreign investors.); see also Fang, supra note 179, at
210.
224. See supra note 184 and sources cited therein.  To further ensure state domination, an individual
may own no more than 0.5% of a company’s total outstanding shares.  See Opinion, supra note 182,
arts. 10, 12, 13, 24; see also Bersani, supra note 2, at 314-15 n.44.  Shanghai exchange regulations also
contain the same limitation.  See Qian, supra note 110, at 87 n.102.
225. See Fang, supra note 179, at 211; Mark O’Neill, Securities: Doubts Grow About Command-Style
Controls, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 12, 1998, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA
File; Foo Choy Peng & Christine Chan, Deng’s Inheritance Booms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 12,
1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File; Zaloom & Hongchuan, supra note 190, at
27; This Week in Asia, supra note 199, at 1; see also supra note 184.  The government is investigating the
possibility of allowing the sale of state shares to state-owned investment companies.  See Shanghai
Morning Close, AFX ASIA, Aug. 14, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library.  To do so, it may need to
inject capital into the investment firms to help them buy state shares, presumably because the govern-
ment wants “to reduce the proportion of listed companies’ state shares before the country enters the
World Trade Organization.”  Id. (quoting a securities dealer); see also China Discussing Detailed Meas-
ures for Cut in State Ownership of Listed Firms, AFX ASIA, Oct. 21, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library (reporting on the initiatives in the Communist Party Central Committee “to allow a reduction
in listed companies’ state shares” without undermining the stability of the stock market); Kit Marlow, A
Week of Praise and Promises for China’s SOE Reformers, CHINA ONLINE (Aug. 6, 1999) (visited Dec.
7, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/econ_news/newsarchive/secure/1999/august/c9080530.asp>
(examining the partial privatization of state firms through the sale and trading of state shares held in
Handan Iron and Steel, Shanghai Petrochemcial, Shenergy, and Jilin Chemical Fibre, companies in-
cluded in the first batch of partial privatization); Shanghai A Shares Close Flat Amid Caution, AFX
EUR. FOCUS, June 28, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library (discussing the government’s plan to
begin allowing the trading of state shares); Shanghai Stocks Rise 3.7 Percent As Insurance Money May
Enter Market, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 27, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library (reporting
that the CSRC may allow two listed companies’ state shares to begin trading).
226. See Peng, supra note 205, at 4.
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the company had recognized its mistake.227  Given the fact that state shares
comprise the majority of a company’s total shares—Harbin’s state shares, for
example, constituted seventy-four percent of its total228—the illiquidity of state-
owned shares “makes it difficult for stock markets to exercise their function of
adjusting state owned assets structurally,”229 causing the market to be marked by
excessive state domination.230
Despite repeated suggestions that state and legal person shares be merged
with individual shares to make them tradeable231 and hence the market for
trading more liquid, the government has rejected the proposal “because it has a
bearing on the property rights system of state-owned assets and the business
administration system.”232  When the highly entrepreneurial province of Shenz-
hen issued a regulation allowing state enterprises to trade their 1994 bonus
shares six months after issuance, the central government promptly reversed the
provincial decree.  As Zhu Li, then the spokesperson for the Securities Regula-
tory Committee, declared, “trading in shares other than those held by individu-
als is banned because it involves aspects of transfer of national property
rights.”233
Other, more modest suggestions have not been accepted either.  As far back
as 1993, there were rumors that state officials might be willing to allow state en-
terprises to be “quasi-privatized.”  In that case, state holdings could decrease to
twenty or even fifteen percent,234 from the current level of fifty percent or more
of total issued shares. Under another proposal, state-held shares would be
traded, but the state would retain the right to redeem the shares within five
years.  “[T]he proposal would enable state-held shares to effectively realise
their value, improve a company’s shareholding structure and avoid loss of state-
owned property.”235  Should the state elect not to exercise its right of redemp-
tion within the allotted time period, its decision presumably would be based on
the calculation that a better return could be achieved elsewhere.
As has been suggested, firms should be allowed to issue common stock236
that is not owned by the state, and public investors should be allowed to pur-
227. See Fang, supra note 179, at 232-33, 238 n.163.  Harbin had modeled its transfer scheme after
the experiences of two companies on the Shanghai exchange that had transferred their state shares to
their respective individual shareholders without interference from the CSRC.  See id. at 237-38.
228. See Fang, supra note 179, at 232.
229. Foo Choy Peng, 5.5b Shares Planned for Mainlanders, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 20, 1994,
at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
230; see supra note 184 and sources cited therein.
231. See infra notes 234-235.
232. Peng, supra note 229, at 4 (statement by Liu Hongru, chairperson of the CSRC).
233. CSRC Puts Stopper on Shenzhen Share Plan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1994, at 4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
234. See China to Cut State Holdings to 20%, Paper Says, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 7, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, JEN File.
235. Christine Chan, Calls Growing to End China’s Share Classes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec.
3, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
236. Common stockholders are considered residual claimants in the corporation because their
claims to income and assets of the corporation come after all other claims have been satisfied.  See, e.g.,
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chase a majority without the current system of restrictions, which would, in
turn, enable the market for corporate control to function more effectively,
thereby lowering agency costs.237  A parallel can be found in studies comparing
the performance of firms in which there are residual claimants238 with those in
which there are none or firms in which the residual claimants have no voting
rights. “Firms without shareholders do poorly compared with other firms, and
firms whose structure prevents the formation of a control bloc of shares also do
relatively poorly.”239  For example, mutual banks or savings and loans, where the
right to vote depends on deposits and not transferable shares, show a lower
level of economic performance when compared with commercial banks, in
which there are transferable shares.240 This suggests that a public and liquid
market for shares allows capital markets to function more effectively and en-
ables firms to operate more efficiently.241
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 6.03(c) (1984).  Common stockholders have greater
potential for greater returns on their investments but also lower right of priority and greater risks of
loss.  They are thus given control of the corporation through voting rights, that is, the right to select the
board of directors.  See also MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 291 (the owner of a property re-
tains the right of residual control, that is, the right to dispose of the assets in any manner not prohibited
by law or not contractually restricted, and the right to claim profits after other claimants, for example,
the government, creditors, and suppliers, have been paid).
237. The active trading of shares itself creates a market mechanism to monitor the business. The
market price of a share is a reflection of the underlying economic performance of the company and its
management.  For the share price to serve that purpose, there must be an efficient market for the trad-
ing of the shares, so that the share price reflects all available information. This is the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis: numerous active traders reacting quickly to new information, which is immediately
reflected in the price of the shares. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 323-31 (5th ed. 1996).
238. See supra notes 18, 19 and infra notes 239-240.
239. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 72 (1991).  Firms that have clearly identifiable residual claimants generally do better than firms
with none.  See also David G. Davies, The Efficiency of Public Versus Private Firms: The Case of Aus-
tralia’s Two Airlines, 14 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1971).  The comparison is limited to firms that operate for
profit only.
240. See Maureen O’Hara, Property Rights and the Financial Firm, 24 J.L. & ECON. 317, 319-21
(1981).  In a mutual savings and loan, the depositor’s position is one of holding deposits rather than
owning shares, presumably to “elevate the depositor’s relationship to the association from that of
owner to that of depositor-creditor, thus allowing the depositor a higher claim should liquidation occur.
If the depositor is a creditor, however, it is difficult to discern exactly who owns a mutual.” Id. at 319.
Equally significant, “[b]ecause the value of the mutual association cannot be sold in the market, in-
creasing the association’s value is not the important objective it is in the stock association.” Id. at 321.
By contrast, where the owners of a stock association are the stockholders, “[m]anagement is under the
control of the owners . . . [and] property rights are clearly defined.” Id. at 320; see also Davies, supra
note 239, at 149-50 (discussing the economic limitations of public ownership in that “[a] public owner is
unable to sell or exchange property rights to his share of public ownership whereas a private owner may
at some price either buy or sell ownership rights to private property.” In turn, “if ownership is transfer-
able, there are comparative advantage effects . . . .”); Eric Rasmusen, Mutual Banks and Stock Banks,
31 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1988).
241. Assuming that there is an effective and liquid capital market, this market can be efficient and
still entirely private, with its own system of private ordering and governance, in other words, without an
SEC-type of oversight.  See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373  (1998) (“[B]efore the enactment of the federal securities laws in
the 1930s, public corporations voluntarily disclosed financial statements, typically under a stock ex-
change listing requirement, that contained substantially all of the information subsequently required
under the federal laws.”).  Professor Romano discussed a study by George Benston that found that be-
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Chinese privatization, by contrast, has been astonishingly unconcerned by
issues of market efficiency.  Rather it has been characterized by one overarch-
ing concern: that the reservoir of private capital in the non-state sector be
brought under the state’s control to serve the state’s financial needs.  As I have
shown above, the securities market has been designed to bring in private or for-
eign capital for state companies within the tightly circumscribed perimeters of
state-controlled “market socialism.” First, through its regulation of the listing
process and the shares quota system, the government ensures that state, not
private or foreign companies, have priority access to investment capital.  Sec-
ond, through its share classification rules, the government also ensures that pri-
vate capital drawn into state firms as individual shares remains submerged un-
der the domination of majority state and legal person shares.  Finally, through
transfer regulations that prohibit trading in state and legal person shares, the
government further ensures that the state retains its position as the super-
dominant majority shareholder.  With such single-minded emphasis on the
market as a mere fundraising vehicle—and everything else, such as market li-
quidity, shareholder rights and governance mechanisms to constrain predatory
behavior, whether by state or private actors, only a secondary issue—it is not
surprising that state-sector reform still leaves much to be desired.
State-sector privatization has not worked because it has not been supported
by the institutional framework that is necessary to make a property rights re-
gime work.  While China is now adopting a Coasian model in its effort to create
property rights—based on the presumption that once property rights are cre-
ated they will be allocated to the highest-valued use—it has not adopted the in-
stitutional framework necessary to minimize transaction costs and thereby fa-
cilitate the movement of resources to the highest-valued use.242  As Coase noted
in his discussion of how the state could institute the necessary framework to re-
duce the costs of transacting,
[s]ince, by and large, people choose to perform those actions which they think will
promote their own interests, the way to alter their behavior in the economic spheres is
to make it in their interest to do so.  The only means available to the government for
doing this . . . is a change in the law or its administration.  The forms such changes may
take are many.  They may amend the rights and duties which people are allowed to
fore the passage of the federal securities laws in the 1930s, the listed companies, pursuant to require-
ments imposed by the private securities exchanges themselves, had already produced annual reports
and other requirements except for reports of the firms’ sales later mandated by federal law.  Professor
Benston also found that there was no significant price effect for firms affected by the new mandated
disclosure—those 38% listed on the New York Stock Exchange that had not previously reported their
sales—and those firms that are not so affected—those 62% listed on the New York Stock Exchange
that had already disclosed sales information prior to the federal requirement.  See George J. Benston,
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144-45 (1973); George Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Gov-
ernment-Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements,  41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 30, 51-52
(Summer 1977).
242. For a discussion of Coase and transaction costs, see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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acquire or are deemed to possess, or they may make transactions more or less costly
by altering the requirements for making a legally binding contract.243
Reforms in the institutional framework in which China’s state enterprises
operate are thus crucial if privatization is to result in the creation of a true
property rights regime and a truly market-oriented, rather than politically con-
trolled, market.  In this respect, even a minimalist Delaware-type model of cor-
porate governance would be highly effective in altering the behavior of owners
and managers.  First, basic corporate formalities to ensure that a corporation
exists and acts as an entity separate and apart from its shareholders are neces-
sary, for example, to prevent the corporation and its controlling stockholder—
in China, the state, in most instances—from acting as each other’s alter ego, and
thereby creating intermingled and muddled ownership rights, which privatiza-
tion itself is supposed to have rendered transparent.  As the Magang example
demonstrates, privatizing does not necessarily create clearly delineated prop-
erty rights.  Neither the state shareholder, the investing public, nor some other
state enterprise can be said to truly hold the property right in the quasi-
privatized, state-owned firm, with the related rights of control and return nor-
mally associated with ownership.  Second, adopting rules that permit majority
ownership by non-state entities and the trading of such shares would create a
more liquid market and facilitate the movement of assets to the highest-valued
use.  Finally, permitting shareholder suits to enforce the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty would also minimize transaction costs, particularly those related
to investigation and monitoring costs inherent in principal/agent problems.
State-sector privatization, in other words, is necessary but not sufficient.
Unless there is a functioning market equipped with a functioning property
rights regime, privatization by itself is not sufficient to induce a change in the
behavior of newly privatized, state-owned enterprises.  Privatization, in other
words, will not necessarily create a market unless the proper institutional
framework, as I have suggested above, is put in place. 
VI
CONCLUSION
The discourse on transitional economies has been circumscribed by a num-
ber of incorrect assumptions about the fundamentals of economic reform and
the very foundation of a functioning market economy.  First, it has been widely
assumed that the failure of command economies means that state ownership
must be replaced by private ownership, which in turn requires immediate state-
sector privatization.  Second, divesting the state of its assets in state firms and
transferring them to private holders, it was assumed, will result in an efficient
restructuring of the firms by the market itself because privatization will create
243. COASE, supra note 22, at 28; see also COASE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
PRODUCTION, supra note 23, at 716-18 (noting that legal institutions have an effect on transaction costs
and on the nature of transactions that take place).
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the market, which will then force the newly privatized firms to act in competi-
tive, market-oriented ways.
Those were the assumptions that guided the transitional path in Russia.
China, however, has proven these assumptions wrong.  In a period of twenty
years, China has created and embarked on its own path of reform, one mark-
edly different from the “Washington Consensus”244 model of transition pre-
scribed for and applied to Russia.  It began privatizing its economy by leaving
the state sector intact and by concentrating on removing barriers to entrepre-
neurship, allowing new firms to be created, and establishing, gradually but
steadfastly, a market-oriented economy.  Between 1978 and 1996, the country
grew at an annual average rate of almost ten percent, mostly because of the
proliferation of new firms in the new, non-state sector, established at the margin
of and parallel to the old state sector.  The initial preservation of state firms, in
many cases, served as an anchor for the new firms and stimulated their growth.
The new firms, in turn, acted as an economic and social cushion, absorbing
workers from the old state sector as it went through the difficult process of re-
structuring.
In phase one of China’s reform, the focus was on the creation of new firms.
The state allowed the redeployment of resources from less productive agricul-
tural communes to more productive household farming.  With relatively little
cost to and involvement of the government, the basic foundations for a market-
oriented economy were instituted to facilitate the entry of new businesses.  In-
centives were created by allowing farmers to sell any above-quota surplus on
the open market, which resulted in a spectacular increase in rural productivity
and most significantly, an accumulation of private capital for investment and en-
trepreneurship.
As important as entry is to entrepreneurship, its inverse—exit—is crucial as
well.  Subject to hard budget constraints, the new firms in the non-state sector,
unlike the state-owned enterprises, have no access to state credit or subsidies
and must rely on their own retained earnings for their operating budgets.  The
purchase of inputs and the sale of outputs must be conducted within a commer-
cially oriented framework and must be responsive to price signals from the
market.  Those who fail to be sufficiently competitive face the threat of bank-
ruptcy-induced market exit.  Thus, in the non-state economy at least, economic
actors are granted autonomy but are also subject to restrictions—a credible
threat of bankruptcy and the constraints of a hard budget.  Privatization—de-
fined here as the creation of new firms and the establishment of a separate mar-
ket economy—has resulted in an impressive rise in economic growth and a con-
comitant increase in the living standards of the majority of the country’s
citizens.
In stark contrast to its vibrant non-state sector, however, China’s state sec-
tor is on the verge of an economic crisis so severe that it threatens to drag down
244.  Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 4.
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the country’s entire economy along with it.  Restricted by the mantra of “mar-
ket socialism,” the reformers first attempted to pursue state-sector reform by
means other than the transformation of the ownership base of state firms, thus
sidestepping inflammatory labels such as privatization in favor of more prag-
matic strategies such as decentralization and incentivization.  Phase two of
China’s reform emphasized the separation of the state’s ownership from ad-
ministration of an enterprise, so that management rights could be transferred
downward to the level of the firm, and managerial autonomy could be trans-
lated into increased firm productivity.
While that strategy theoretically should have yielded positive results, it
failed to do so because, as I have argued throughout this article, merely sepa-
rating the firm from the state and granting the firm more rights, freedom, and
autonomy does not, by itself, produce positive behavior.  While liberation from
the strictures of the plan and the separation of the firm from the state are posi-
tive steps, decentralization in China broke up the command economy and cre-
ated a complex layering of governmental agencies at various levels of vertical
and horizontal chains of authority, all eager to exert extractive authority over
firm assets but none willing to be held responsible for the firm’s financial being.
Problems at the state level resulting from decentralization created similar
problems at the firm level.  Decentralization allowed managers more autonomy,
but without an internal governance regime to enable owners to monitor their
agents, and without a corresponding external regime to discipline managers
through the imposition of hard budget constraints and a credible bankruptcy
threat, autonomy without governance or accountability has not produced mar-
ket actors who act in asset-enhancing ways.
As a result, state firms remain stubbornly nonmarket in their orientation.  In
its current phase of reform, China finally is embarking on what it has deferred
for years: conversion of state firms into shareholding companies whose shares
trade publicly on domestic and foreign stock markets.  Chinese state-sector pri-
vatization, however, has been a disappointment in many respects.  First, the
government has, from the beginning, pursued it not to turn state-owned enter-
prises into privately owned enterprises, but to bring the huge accumulation of
inert private capital into the state’s orbit by enticing the Chinese public to use
private savings to purchase shares in state-dominant firms.  Second, the gov-
ernment accordingly has used the securities market for the primary, if not sole,
purpose of fundraising, with only lip service ostensibly paid to ancillary matters
such as shareholder rights, financial disclosure, and market liquidity.  Third, in
its effort to use the securities market to salvage failing state enterprises, the
government also has limited listing to state, not private companies, thereby pre-
venting critical capital resources from flowing toward investments that might
generate the greatest returns.  And fourth, to maintain the state’s continuing
domination of supposedly “privatized” companies, even at the expense of mar-
ket liquidity, shares are divided into state, legal person, and individual shares,
with state shares constituting approximately fifty percent or more of total issued
shares, none of which can be traded.  These continuing attempts by the gov-
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ernment to constrain the securities market within ideologically acceptable pe-
rimeters—even as it goes about the business of reforming the ownership struc-
ture of state enterprises—have resulted in serious and systemic market distor-
tions.
Even more disturbing than the flawed implementation of privatization,
however, is the fact that China, which has avoided many of the economic diffi-
culties that came from immediate state-sector privatization, is now duplicating
the same flawed assumptions that characterized Russia’s reform process: a sin-
gular preoccupation with privatization, that is, nominal ownership issues, at the
expense of everything else needed to make ownership work.  Even though the
government refuses to speak the outward language of privatization, preferring
instead to “securitize” or “corporatize,” it has been adopting the very underly-
ing logic of the “Washington Consensus” of which it is so publicly critical.  Too
easily, it has been assumed that privatization should take place before the insti-
tution of a regulatory environment or a market framework because privatiza-
tion will set into motion the market itself, which will, in turn, spawn competi-
tive, market-oriented behavior.  Yet, as has been amply documented, complex
organizations with dispersed owners are inevitably characterized by the separa-
tion of ownership and control.  Hence, a complex combination of issues inevita-
bly arises, such as those related to principals and agents, informational asymme-
tries, and transaction costs.
In other words, unless China’s privatization discourse is expanded to include
a serious discussion of constraints, rather than just freedom and autonomy, the
institution of clearly defined private property rights will not, by itself, cause a
fundamental transformation in the economic behavior of privatized firms.  The
problem will thus remain: privatized firms that operate within an institutional
environment characterized by the absence of both property rights and of a truly
functional market.
